Isabella Carter
Coercive diplomacy is a political-diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary's will or incentive structure without resorting to military action. It has been increasingly used by US policymakers since the 1950s, with notable instances including Kennedy's successful attempt to compel the Soviet Union to remove missiles, President Johnson's failed attempt to coerce Hanoi into ending their support for Viet Cong forces during the Vietnam War, and the Clinton administration's 1994 negotiations with North Korea.
| Characteristics | Values |
|---|---|
| Aim | To make an enemy stop or undo an action without resorting to military action |
| Threat | Must be credible and potent enough to persuade the opponent to comply with the demand |
| Force | Not employed as part of a conventional military strategy but as a component of a political-diplomatic strategy |
| Communication | Clear communication, signalling and bargaining are used to make the opponent aware of one's intentions, motivations and credibility |
| Strategy | Includes a system of rewards and punishments to impose a risk for the continuance of undesirable behaviour |
| Time | Coercive diplomacy is difficult to sustain over long periods of time |
| Political Support | It is challenging to maintain political support for coercive diplomacy over long periods of time |
| Military Objectives | The achievement of military objectives might not translate into the desired diplomatic or political objectives |
| Success | Coercive diplomacy fails more often than it succeeds |
| Types | Ultimatum, tacit ultimatum, "try-and-see" approach, "gradual turning of the screw", "carrot and stick" approach |
Explore related products
What You'll Learn
Coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war
Coercive diplomacy is a viable alternative to war or military action. It is a political-diplomatic strategy that aims to persuade an adversary to back down without resorting to force. This strategy is flexible and psychological, focusing on clear communication, signalling, and bargaining to make the opponent aware of the coercer's intentions, motivations, and credibility.
The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu sums up the concept: "to make an enemy stop or undo an action without resorting to military action, but through issuing a specific demand backed by a threat of punishment for non-compliance." The threat must be credible and potent enough to make compliance seem more favourable to the opponent.
A state employing coercive diplomacy can achieve a range of objectives. The most limited goal is to make the adversary stop an ongoing action. A more ambitious goal is to reverse what has already been accomplished, forcing the opponent not only to stop but also to give up any advantages gained. The most challenging objective is to bring about a change in the opponent's hostile behaviour by altering their government or regime's nature.
Alexander George's book, "Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy As an Alternative to War," examines seven cases from the past half-century in which the United States employed coercive diplomacy, including Pearl Harbor and the Persian Gulf. The book provides valuable insights into diplomatic processes and managing international conflict.
Diplomacy and Prophecies in Pendor: A Complex Strategy
You may want to see also
Coercive diplomacy in US foreign policy
Coercive diplomacy has been a popular tool for US policymakers since the 1950s. It is a form of diplomacy that aims to make an enemy stop or undo an action without resorting to military action. Instead, it involves issuing a specific demand backed by a threat of punishment for non-compliance.
The US has a mixed record of success with coercive diplomacy. For example, Kennedy successfully employed coercive diplomacy to compel the Soviet Union to remove nuclear missiles. However, President Johnson's attempt to use coercive diplomacy to get Hanoi to stop supporting the Viet Cong forces failed.
There are several challenges to using coercive diplomacy. Firstly, it is difficult to maintain political support for it over long periods. Secondly, it is hard to judge success and decide on the level of force that should be used. Thirdly, coercive diplomacy might not always achieve the desired diplomatic or political objectives, even if the military objectives are met. Finally, the use of threats of force by a state can be costly to its reputation if the threats are not credible.
Despite these challenges, coercive diplomacy can be a viable tool for achieving foreign policy objectives under specific circumstances. For instance, during the 1994 negotiations with North Korea, the Clinton administration's use of threats of force produced some concessions from North Korea, which opened up more political room for US policymakers. Ultimately, the choice of a coercive diplomatic strategy depends on the context of the crisis, including factors such as the costs of war, the parties' sense of urgency, and the presence of allies for each party.
Dollar Diplomacy: Taft's Foreign Policy Strategy
You may want to see also
Coercive diplomacy in democratic regimes
Coercive diplomacy has been a popular tool for US policymakers since the 1950s. It is a political-diplomatic strategy aimed at persuading an adversary to back down without resorting to military action. Instead, it involves threatening political consequences, such as expulsion from an international organisation, economic sanctions, or the use of force.
In democratic regimes, the use of coercive diplomacy has its own peculiarities. For instance, it is challenging to maintain political support for coercive diplomacy over long periods. This is because it is difficult to judge success and decide on the appropriate level of force. Coercive diplomacy is also more challenging to manage when employed by international organisations such as NATO or the United Nations.
Robert Art's research on the applications of coercive diplomacy by US policymakers over 12 years showed that it "fails more often than it succeeds". Art outlined three main challenges encountered in the use of coercive diplomacy:
- Compellence is more difficult than deterrence: Trying to compel an adversary to take certain actions requires a system of rewards and punishments, which is challenging to set up and sustain over a long period.
- Limited use of force: Coercive diplomacy involves using force in a very limited way, either to threaten or to use it symbolically.
- Difficulty in judging success: It is hard to define clear policy success, and the completion of military objectives might not always translate into achieving the desired diplomatic or political objectives.
Despite these challenges, there have been instances where coercive diplomacy has been employed successfully. For example, Kennedy successfully employed coercive diplomacy to compel the Soviet Union to remove their missiles. In the late 1990s, a US-led international coalition of states attempted to use coercive diplomacy to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. They first imposed an embargo on Iraqi imports and exports, and when this did not work, they issued an ultimatum backed by the threat of military force.
Black Lives Matter: Political Donations and Their Impact
You may want to see also
Explore related products
The role of inducements and threats
Coercive diplomacy is a means of achieving political objectives and furthering a state's national interest without resorting to war. It involves the use of threats and inducements to persuade an adversary to comply with one's demands. The threat of force is used as a component of a political-diplomatic strategy rather than as a conventional military strategy. This strategy is flexible and psychological, with clear communication, signalling, and bargaining employed to make the opponent aware of the coercer's intentions, motivations, and credibility.
The "carrot and stick" approach is contrasted with blackmail, which is an offensive strategy where a threat is used to coerce a subject to give up something of value without resistance. In coercive diplomacy, the use of threats and inducements is defensive, and the requests of the coercing power are typically limited to what is necessary to protect its national interest. The inducements and threats employed in coercive diplomacy can take many forms, from economic sanctions and political consequences to the use of force.
The use of inducements and threats in coercive diplomacy can be a viable means of achieving political objectives under specific circumstances. The coercing power must be aware of the limits of this practice and adhere to strict principles of crisis management to avoid the escalation of a crisis. The strategic environment and the policies of leaders also play a role in the success of coercive diplomacy, as seen in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the asymmetry of interests favoured the United States.
Diplomacy's Dark Art: Identifying Terrorists
You may want to see also
The challenges of coercive diplomacy
Coercive diplomacy is a common practice in interstate relations, which aims to achieve political objectives and foster a state's national interest without waging a war. It involves the use of force as a component of a political-diplomatic strategy, rather than as a conventional military strategy.
However, there are several challenges associated with coercive diplomacy. Firstly, it can be difficult to maintain political support for coercive diplomacy over extended periods. This is partly because it is challenging to judge success and determine the appropriate level of force to employ at different stages of the effort. The dynamic nature of political objectives can further complicate assessments of success. As a result, coercive diplomacy is even more challenging to manage when employed by international organisations such as NATO or the United Nations.
A second challenge is that the completion of military objectives may not lead to the desired diplomatic or political outcomes. For example, the destruction of military bases through a cruise missile attack may not result in the adversary taking the desired political actions. This highlights the distinction between coercive diplomacy and brute force, where the former involves clear communication, signalling, and bargaining to persuade the opponent to comply.
A third challenge is the potential for coercive diplomacy to escalate a crisis rather than resolve it. This risk underscores the importance of the coercing power being aware of the limits of coercive diplomacy and adhering to strict principles of crisis management.
Finally, coercive diplomacy may be difficult to distinguish from blackmail, particularly when the use of threats is perceived as offensive rather than defensive, and when the demands of the coercing power exceed what is necessary to protect its national interest. This challenge was recognised by Sun Tzu, who emphasised that for coercive diplomacy to be effective, the threat must be credible and potent enough to persuade the opponent that compliance is in their interest.
Spam Texts: Should You Reply or Ignore?
You may want to see also
Frequently asked questions
Coercive diplomacy is a strategy that aims to make an enemy stop or undo their actions without resorting to military action. Instead, it involves issuing a specific demand backed by a threat of punishment for non-compliance.
Coercive diplomacy has been used by the United States several times since the 1950s, including during interventions in Somalia and Kosovo, and negotiations with North Korea in 1994.
Coercive diplomacy is challenging because it relies on the effective use of threats, which must be credible and potent enough to persuade the opponent. It is also difficult to maintain political support and judge success over long periods.
There are five basic types of coercive diplomacy: the ultimatum, the tacit ultimatum, the "try-and-see" approach, the "gradual turning of the screw", and the "carrot and stick" approach.
Yes, coercive diplomacy has failed in certain cases, such as the 1994 negotiations with North Korea, where inducements were used more than threats of force, and air strikes against Libya, which did not significantly reduce its terrorist activities.
