Simone Lawson
The puzzle of material constitution has been approached in various ways by different philosophers. One of the theories, known as the just-matter theory, rejects the assumption of creation by arguing that a sculptor does not create a statue but merely rearranges a lump of clay into a different shape. This theory, attributed to Dr. Nick Effingham, denies the existence of the statue as a separate entity and instead asserts that it is merely a different stage in the life of the lump of clay. Another approach, associated with Peter Unger and Peter van Inwagen, posits that only 'mereological simples' exist, meaning objects without proper parts. This theory denies the existence of composite objects like statues and lumps, viewing them as collections of microscopic particles. These theories challenge traditional notions of creation and identity, offering alternative perspectives on the nature of objects and their survival.
| Characteristics | Values |
|---|---|
| Denial of existence | Denying the existence of David or insisting that David existed on Monday |
| Denial of survival | Denying the existence of Lump or claiming that Lump does not survive being shaped into a statue |
| Theory | Coincidence or cohabitation |
| Denial of | Creation, the thesis that a sculptor created the statue from scratch |
| Theory | Just-Matter |
| View | That the only things in existence are 'mereological simples' |
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What You'll Learn
Denying the existence of David or insisting that David existed on Monday
The puzzle of material constitution has many possible replies, one of which is to deny the existence of David or insist that David existed on Monday. This response is associated with the eliminativist views of Peter Unger (1979), Peter van Inwagen (1990), and Roderick Chisholm (1979).
This perspective challenges the assumption of 'creation', arguing that the sculptor did not create the statue, but merely rearranged the lump of clay into a different shape, changing its properties without creating anything new. This theory, known as "just-matter", suggests that there are only "hunks" of materials arranged in various ways, implying that the lump and the statue are not truly distinct objects.
The view held by Unger, van Inwagen, and Chisholm is that the only things that exist are "mereological simples", or objects without proper parts. These would be the fundamental physical particles that comprise the universe. Thus, the statue and the lump are not single entities, but collections of microscopic particles.
This theory has implications for the concept of survival as well. By denying the existence of the statue as a separate entity, the idea of it being destroyed or surviving in a different form is rendered moot. The statue is simply a rearrangement of particles, and any changes made to it are not seen as affecting its survival or identity.
However, it is important to note that van Inwagen's version of this theory differs in that he argues for the existence of living organisms, allowing for the existence of people. This modification addresses some of the concerns surrounding the denial of the existence of objects, such as statues and lumps, while still maintaining the core principles of the theory.
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Denying the existence of Lump
The simplest way to avoid the puzzles of material constitution is to deny the existence of some of the objects that give rise to those problems. For instance, if one claims that there are no such things as statues and lumps of clay, then there is no threat of having a statue and a lump of clay in the same place at the same time. This is the approach taken by the eliminativist, who denies the existence of objects like Lump.
Eliminativists like Peter Unger and Peter van Inwagen reject the premise that Lump existed on Monday, denying the existence of lumps of clay like Lump. They argue that the only things in existence are 'mereological simples' - objects with no proper parts, or the fundamental physical particles that make up the universe. Statues and lumps are then merely collections of these particles arranged in a certain way, rather than single objects in themselves.
This view is supported by the just-matter theory, which rejects the assumption of 'creation' and instead argues that a sculptor merely rearranges a lump of clay into a particular shape, changing its properties without creating anything new. According to this theory, the statue is simply a particular period in the life of the lump of clay, and the lump continues to exist even after the statue is squashed.
Another theory that denies the existence of Lump is the dominant kind view, defended by Michael Burke. Burke assumes that there is a single object, Rex, which is both a lump of clay and a statue. However, this assumption is problematic because kinds like lump and statue are associated with different modal properties and persistence conditions. For example, a lump of clay has the property of being able to survive squashing, while a statue does not.
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Rejecting the standard formulation of Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law, or the Indiscernibility of Identicals, is a widely accepted principle governing the notion of numerical identity. The principle states that if 'a' is identical to 'b', then any property possessed by 'a' is also possessed by 'b'. This means that two objects cannot differ only numerically, or 'solo numero'.
However, there are some apparent counterexamples to this principle, and some philosophers have proposed logical systems that permit violations of Leibniz's Law. For instance, Leibniz's Law fails to explain the continuity of identity over time. This is because we live in dimensions of space and time, and so what constitutes any thing (e.g. a person) ought to include their extent in space and time. Therefore, it doesn't make sense to speak of a different "me" today and yesterday; instead, each instance is merely a snapshot of a whole temporal existence.
Another counterexample is that Leibniz's Law is only applicable in cases of monadic, not polyadic, properties. Furthermore, one could deny that real identity depends on there being no reasoning-relevant intensional differences. This means that the man who is Mark Twain can be the same man as the one who is Samuel Clemens, but if John doesn't know this, then this creates a context in which there are intensional differences.
To develop a well-motivated metaphysics for rejecting Leibniz's Law, one must adopt a highly revisionary picture, such as a "metaphysics of stuff". This stuff ontology takes stuff to be fundamental and views the world as composed of an infinite descending hierarchy of kinds and portions of stuff.
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The deflationist views of Rudolf Carnap
Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) was a German and American philosopher and one of the best-known philosophers of the twentieth century. He is often regarded as a deflationist, holding the view that ontological disputes are vacuous and/or inconsequential. However, this interpretation is not entirely accurate. While Carnap did not seek to dismiss arguments about the existence of various entities or endorse eliminativism, he also did not seek to patronise or do away with ontological questions.
Instead, Carnap's goal was to demonstrate that engaging in ontological theorising is compatible with empiricist scruples. He proposed that ontological discourse is not a descriptive, fact-stating mechanism but a tool that expresses commitments to adopting specific linguistic/conceptual resources or "linguistic frameworks". This perspective aligns with his expressivism. Carnap's views on this matter can be understood as a form of "conceptual engineering", a term he used to describe philosophical inquiry. Rather than seeking knowledge or understanding how things are, conceptual engineering focuses on how, within the constraints of available tools and scientific knowledge, we want things to be. This voluntaristic approach underlies Carnap's philosophy.
Carnap applied his voluntaristic conceptual engineering to various problems, including those within science and larger issues related to science, such as scientific language and its place in our lives. He also employed it at different levels, from local reconstructions or explications of specific concepts to broader applications in entire language frameworks. Initially, Carnap's engineering projects aimed to replace ordinary language and traditional concepts with more scientific alternatives. However, his perspective evolved to become more pluralistic and dialectical, recognising the practical limitations of this approach.
Carnap's work extended beyond philosophical inquiry and conceptual engineering. He made significant contributions to logic, language analysis, the theory of probability, and the philosophy of science. Carnap was particularly interested in building bridges between disciplines such as geometry, physics, and philosophy. His doctoral thesis, for example, focused on providing a logical basis for a theory of space and time in physics, demonstrating his interdisciplinary approach.
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The relative identity theory of Peter Geach
The Theory of Relative Identity is a logical innovation by the 20th-century English philosopher Peter Thomas Geach. The theory is motivated by the same sort of mathematical examples as Frege's definition by abstraction. Geach's theory seeks to give a logical sense to mathematical talk "up to" a given equivalence E through replacing E by identity. However, unlike Frege, Geach aims to avoid the introduction of new abstract objects, which he believes causes unnecessary ontological inflation.
Geach's proposal aims to provide a logical justification for the way of thinking about the relativized notions of sameness and difference. He argues that any equivalence relation can be used to specify a criterion of relative identity. For example, there is a certain equivalence relation between ordered pairs of integers, which allows us to say that x and y, though distinct ordered pairs, are one and the same rational number. According to Geach, things can be the same in one way while differing in others. For instance, two printed letters "aa" are the same as a type but different as tokens.
Geach's view interprets the identity statement 'a=b' as 'a is the same F as b', where F is a kind-term or sortal. This interpretation is motivated by the idea that different choices of sortal can produce different identity statements with different truth values. For example, if 'a' denotes a statue at an early time, and 'b' denotes a statue at a later time, 'a' may be the same mass of clay as 'b', but not the same statue. However, the choice of sortal may be prejudged in the meaning of the names, in which case no discrepancy arises, although sortals still play a role in evaluating identity statements.
The logic of relative identities is described as having the language of first-order predicate logic, without the use of certain operators or singular terms. Its two-place predicates are partitioned into two classes, with rules of inference based on ordinary predicate logic, along with two additional rules stating that relative-identity predicates express symmetrical and transitive relations. However, the notion of relative identity remains controversial from a logical perspective.
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Frequently asked questions
The paradox of the lump of clay and the statue is a puzzle in the philosophy of material constitution, which asks how a lump of clay and a statue made from that clay can exist simultaneously in the same place.
The theory of coincidence or cohabitation challenges the assumption that two objects cannot be in the same place at the same time. It argues that the statue and the lump of clay coincide, sharing the same spatial location and matter.
The just-matter theory denies the assumption of creation, arguing that a sculptor does not create a statue but merely rearranges a lump of clay into a particular shape, changing its properties. It asserts that there are only "hunks" of materials arranged differently and that there is no separate existence for the statue.
The relative identity theory, associated with Peter Geach, denies Leibniz's Law, which states that for any x and y, if x is identical to y, then x and y share all the same properties. Geach argues that identity is always relative to a kind, so while we can say a statue is the same statue as a lump of clay, it is not identical to it simpliciter.
