Coercive Diplomacy's Effectiveness Against Iran In 2002-2003

Since 2002, when the full scope of Iran's nuclear program was revealed to the public, the United States has primarily relied on coercive diplomacy to force Iran to accept limitations and oversight that go beyond the NPT and Iran's safeguards agreement. Coercive diplomacy is a strategy that can achieve foreign policy objectives with fewer costs, but it can also backfire and make peaceful conflict resolution more difficult. This raises the question: did coercive diplomacy work against Iran from 2002-2003?

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US-Iran relations

Since 2002, when the full scope of Iran's nuclear program was revealed, the United States has relied on coercive diplomacy to force Iran to accept limitations and oversight beyond the NPT and Iran's safeguards agreement. This strategy has been deemed attractive due to its potential to achieve foreign policy objectives at a lower cost. However, it is argued that coercive diplomacy has failed to persuade Iran to accept binding constraints on its nuclear fuel cycle activities. Instead, it has intensified Iranian distrust of the US, strengthening their determination to advance their nuclear program.

The US's coercive diplomacy efforts have included sanctions, which some argue have been effective at changing Iran's behaviour. In 2003, Iran agreed to start talks with European nations on limiting uranium enrichment due to international pressure, including the US invasion of neighbouring Iraq. This demonstrates the impact of coercive diplomacy in influencing Iran's decisions.

On the other hand, critics argue that the US's unilateral use of military action and coercive measures have hindered progress in US-Iran relations. The Iranian government has denounced such actions as a violation of their sovereignty and an act of aggression.

Overall, while there have been some signs of flexibility and compliance from Iran, the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy in achieving the desired outcomes is debated. The complex dynamics between the two nations require a nuanced approach, and the potential backfire of coercive strategies must be carefully considered to avoid making peaceful conflict resolution more difficult.

The Bush administration's

In his 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush included Iran in what he called the ''Axis of Evil', along with Iraq and North Korea. This classification was based on accusations of sponsoring terrorism and pursuing nuclear capabilities. Bush's speech signalled a shift towards hostility and a willingness to use unilateral military action to address perceived threats to American interests.

Additionally, the Bush administration warned Iran against destabilising the interim government in Afghanistan and threatening Washington's long-term goals in the region. Bush threatened that the coalition would deal with Iran "in diplomatic ways initially", to which Tehran responded with denunciation. This episode further strained the already fragile relationship between the two countries.

Overall, the Bush administration's coercive diplomacy towards Iran during this period does not appear to have achieved its intended objectives. Instead, it contributed to a deterioration in relations and a strengthening of Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Iran's nuclear programme

In 2002, the full scope of Iran's nuclear programme and ambitions were revealed to the public, and the US responded by adopting a strategy of coercive diplomacy to force Iran to accept limitations and oversight beyond the NPT and Iran's safeguards agreement. This strategy aimed to achieve foreign policy objectives with fewer costs, but it failed to persuade Iran to accept binding constraints on its nuclear fuel cycle activities. Instead, it strengthened Iran's determination to advance its nuclear programme.

The IAEA has played a significant role in investigating and reporting on Iran's nuclear programme. In 2008, the IAEA issued a report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran, and while it found no evidence of diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful uses, it reiterated that it could not verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme without "transparency measures". Iran's refusal to implement the Additional Protocol was a concern for the IAEA, and it called on member states to share information about Iran's alleged nuclear weaponization studies.

Despite the IAEA's efforts, Iran has continued to pursue its nuclear programme. In 2010, Iran announced that it had laser enrichment capability, and in 2011, the IAEA reported credible evidence that Iran had been conducting experiments aimed at designing a nuclear bomb. In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was implemented to address Iran's uranium enrichment capability, which has been heavily censured by the UN.

The EU has also employed coercive diplomacy in negotiations with Iran regarding the suspension of its nuclear programme. In 2003, the EU-3 (Germany, France, and the UK) and Iran agreed to suspend the programme, but Iran did not comply with the demand. The EU's efforts continued, and they succeeded in bringing Russia and China to abstain from using their veto power against an IAEA resolution that found Iran in violation of the IAEA statute.

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EU-Iran negotiations

The EU-Iran negotiations regarding the suspension of the Iranian nuclear programme began in 2002. This was after the full scope of Iran's nuclear programme and ambitions were revealed to the public by an Iranian opposition movement, the National Council of Resistance.

The EU-3 (Germany, France, and the UK) and Iran agreed to meet in October 2003 and the respective foreign ministers agreed to suspend the programme. However, Iran did not comply with the given demands. The EU continued its efforts and succeeded in bringing Russia and China to abstain from using their veto against an IAEA resolution, showing that Iran was violating the IAEA statute.

The EU-Iran negotiations are part of a broader history of coercive diplomacy between Iran and the US and EU, which dates back to the 1980s. The relationship between Iran and the US shifted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, with the US adopting more confrontational and coercive diplomacy tactics. The Bush administration warned Iran not to try to destabilise the interim government in Afghanistan, threatening to deal with Iran "in diplomatic ways initially". The Iranian government denounced these comments as rude and unfounded.

The US has primarily relied on coercive diplomacy to force Iran to accept limitations and oversight of its nuclear programme. However, scholars argue that coercive diplomacy has failed to persuade Iran to accept binding constraints on its fuel cycle activities. Instead, it has intensified Iranian distrust of the US and strengthened Iran's determination to advance its nuclear fuel cycle programme.

Some commentators argue that coercive diplomacy could work to get a better deal with Iran. They suggest that Iran will only change its behaviour when confronted with overwhelming force and the prospect of an unwinnable war. The NIE noted that Iran's nuclear-related decisions are guided by a "cost-benefit approach" and suggested that Iran halted its covert nuclear weapons programme in 2003 due to "international pressure".

US coercive diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy is a strategy that, if successful, can achieve foreign policy objectives at a low cost. However, it can also backfire and make peaceful conflict resolution more difficult. Since 2002, the US has relied on coercive diplomacy to force Iran to accept limitations and oversight of its nuclear program. This strategy has not persuaded Iran to accept constraints on its nuclear fuel cycle activities and has instead strengthened Iran's determination to expand its program.

US-Iran relations have been strained since the 1970s, with the Iranian nuclear program starting with EU and US cooperation but ending in animosity. The US shift towards coercive diplomacy in the early 2000s was influenced by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which led to the \"Bush Doctrine\" and a more confrontational approach to countries perceived as threats. This included Iran, which was accused of sponsoring terrorism and pursuing nuclear capabilities.

In 2002, the full scope of Iran's nuclear program was revealed to the public, and the US began using coercive diplomacy to force Iran to accept limitations beyond the NPT and Iran's safeguards agreement. This included sanctions and the threat of military action. However, these efforts have not achieved the desired results, with Iran refusing to accept binding constraints on its nuclear fuel cycle activities.

Some argue that coercive diplomacy could still work to get a better deal with Iran, pointing to instances where Iran changed its behaviour in response to overwhelming force or international pressure. For example, Iran halted its covert nuclear weapons program in 2003 due to international pressure and fears of a US attack following the invasion of Iraq. Additionally, sanctions have been effective at changing Iran's behaviour in some instances.

However, critics argue that coercive diplomacy neglects the complex dynamics within the target state. In the case of Iran, sanctions have intensified Iranian distrust of the US and augmented the forces that promote the nuclear fuel cycle program. As a result, some scholars argue that the proliferation risks of Iran's nuclear program could be resolved more effectively through alternative approaches that take into account the factors driving Iran's nuclear policy.

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