Extraordinary Majority: A Constitutional Safeguard

A supermajority is a requirement for a proposal to gain a specified level of support greater than a simple majority (50%+1). Supermajority rules in a democracy can help prevent the majority from eroding the fundamental rights of a minority. Constitutional amendments often require supermajority support, as they are considered more important than other legislative actions. For example, the US Constitution requires a supermajority of two-thirds of both houses of Congress to propose a constitutional amendment, and a three-quarters supermajority of state legislatures for final adoption. Similarly, in Australia, a referendum is required to pass an amendment to the constitution, and it must achieve a double majority, with a majority of those voting nationwide and separate majorities in a majority of states.

Explore related products

Madison's Metronome: The Constitution, Majority Rule, and the Tempo of American Politics (American Political Thought)

$29.99 $29.99

The Constitution of the United States and The Declaration of Independence

$1.99 $6.95

Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule (Murphy Institute Studies in Political Economy)

$35.81 $41

Homeopathic Psychology: Personality Profiles of the Major Constitutional Remedies

$14.39 $25

American Constitutional Law: Governmental Powers and Democracy (Higher Education Coursebook)

$161.49

Revolutionary Constitutions: Charismatic Leadership and the Rule of Law

$32.21 $35

To prevent 'tyranny of the majority' and protect minority rights

The concept of an "extraordinary majority" is closely tied to the principle of preventing "tyranny of the majority" and protecting the rights of minorities, which is a fundamental aspect of constitutional democracies. This principle recognises that while majority rule is essential, it must be balanced with safeguarding the rights and interests of minority groups.

The concern about direct democracy or unlimited majority rule is that it could lead to the oppression of minority rights and viewpoints. In a democratic system, there is a tension between majority rule and minority rights. If left unchecked, the majority's decisions could potentially be used to repress and harm minorities, whether intentionally or not. This repression could take the form of legislation that disadvantages minorities or the undoing of policies that protect minorities, such as affirmative action or anti-discrimination laws.

To address this concern, modern democracies often employ countermajoritarian institutions and rules, which limit the power of the majority to protect minorities. These include constitutional protections of civil liberties and property rights, independent judiciaries, and separation of powers. For example, the U.S. Constitution, the oldest written constitution, includes the Bill of Rights, which protects the rights of individuals. Similarly, the Czech Constitution guarantees civil liberties and empowers the constitutional government to protect them.

However, it is important to note that while countermajoritarian rules are intended to protect minorities, they have sometimes been used by powerful actors to their advantage, such as slaveholders or defenders of discriminatory practices. Additionally, there is a risk that minorities could misuse these protections to routinely block legal measures proposed by the majority.

Overall, the requirement for an "extraordinary majority" in certain situations is a mechanism to prevent the "tyranny of the majority" and ensure the protection of minority rights, which is a crucial aspect of maintaining a fair and just democratic system.

To encourage careful deliberation and compromise

The requirement for an extraordinary majority, or supermajority, in democratic systems is often employed to encourage careful deliberation and compromise. This mechanism is particularly relevant when it comes to amending constitutions, as seen in the US, Australia, Canada, Finland, India, and Bangladesh, among others.

The US Constitution, for instance, requires a supermajority of two-thirds of both houses of Congress to propose a constitutional amendment. Additionally, a three-quarters supermajority of state legislatures is mandated for the final adoption of any constitutional amendment. The US Constitution also necessitates a two-thirds supermajority to override a presidential veto. These heightened thresholds are intended to prevent a "tyranny of the majority," as described by John Adams, and to foster thoughtful deliberation and compromise.

Similarly, in Australia, a referendum is required to pass an amendment to the Constitution, and it must achieve a "double majority." This entails securing a majority of votes nationwide, along with separate majorities in a majority of states (4 out of 6 states). This mechanism ensures that any constitutional changes reflect the will of the majority while also safeguarding the interests of individual states.

In Canada, most constitutional amendments necessitate identical resolutions from the House of Commons, the Senate, and at least two-thirds of provincial legislative assemblies, representing a minimum of 50% of the national population. This intricate supermajority requirement underscores the importance of achieving broad consensus across the country when making fundamental changes to the constitution.

The Indian Constitution also mandates a supermajority of two-thirds of members present and voting in each house of Parliament, along with a majority of the total membership of each house, to amend its constitution. This provision underscores the importance of comprehensive deliberation and consensus-building in the amendment process.

These examples illustrate how the requirement for an extraordinary majority is employed in various democratic contexts to encourage careful deliberation and compromise, particularly when it comes to amending constitutions. By setting higher thresholds, these mechanisms ensure that decisions are not solely dictated by a simple majority but rather reflect a broader consensus, protecting the rights of minorities and fostering thoughtful and inclusive governance.

To amend the Constitution

The constitution requires an extraordinary majority, or supermajority, to amend it because this ensures that any changes to the foundational rules of a political system are carefully considered and widely supported. A supermajority is a requirement for a proposal to gain a level of support greater than a simple majority of 50% + 1 vote.

In the context of amending constitutions, supermajority rules are designed to prevent a "tyranny of the majority" and to protect the rights of minorities. For example, in the United States, a supermajority of two-thirds of both houses of Congress is required to propose a constitutional amendment. This is to ensure that any changes to the fundamental rules governing the nation are not made lightly and have broad support across political divides. Similarly, in Finland, a two-thirds majority in Parliament is required to amend the Finnish Constitution.

The specific requirements for amending a constitution vary from country to country. In Australia, for instance, a referendum is required to pass an amendment to the Constitution, and it must achieve a "double majority": a majority of those voting nationwide, as well as separate majorities in a majority of states (4 out of 6). In Canada, most constitutional amendments can only be passed if identical resolutions are adopted by the House of Commons, the Senate, and two-thirds or more of the provincial legislative assemblies representing at least 50% of the national population.

In some cases, a supermajority may be required for certain types of ballot measures or topics, such as tax increases or changing voting requirements. For example, in Illinois, a supermajority of 60% is required for a constitutional amendment to pass. In other cases, a simple majority may be sufficient, but if the amendment affects a specific state or region, a supermajority from that area may be required. For example, in Louisiana, a simple majority is generally required to approve an amendment, but if it affects five or fewer parishes, a majority statewide vote and a majority vote in those parishes are needed.

Explore related products

Examples & Explanations for Constitutional Law: Individual Rights

$25 $74.95

Examples & Explanations for Constitutional Law: National Power and Federalism (Examples & Explanations Series)

$33 $74.95

Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning

$44.2 $49

Constitution of the United States and The Declaration of Independence: Senator Rand Paul, Delegates of The Constitutional Convention

$2.99 $2.99

Constitutional Dictatorship - Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies

$9.99 $35.99

How to Save a Constitutional Democracy

$21.02 $23

To override a presidential veto

The US Constitution, in Article 1, Section 7, grants the President the power to veto legislation or joint resolutions. This is known as a "regular" veto. In such cases, the President returns a bill to Congress, along with a statement outlining their objections. The veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote in both Houses of Congress, also known as a supermajority. This process ensures that laws are not passed without sufficient consensus and safeguards against hasty or partisan legislation.

The two-thirds majority requirement for overriding a presidential veto is an example of an extraordinary majority mandated by the Constitution. This requirement makes it more challenging to overturn the President's decision, ensuring that the President's perspective is carefully considered and that any override has broad support in Congress.

The Constitution also recognises a "pocket veto," which occurs when the President does not sign a bill into law within ten days (excluding Sundays) and Congress has adjourned before the ten days are up. In this case, the legislation does not become law, and Congress cannot override the veto. This type of veto cannot be overridden as the bill is not returned to Congress, and it highlights the importance of Congress remaining in session to prevent the President from blocking legislation through inaction.

While the two-thirds majority in both chambers is the standard requirement to override a presidential veto, there are some variations at the state and local levels. For example, in Arkansas, a constitutional amendment grants county judges a veto that can be overridden by a three-fifths majority of the quorum court. In some cities, like Louisville and New York City before 1853, mayors had a suspensive veto that could be overridden by a simple majority vote of the council. These exceptions demonstrate that the specific requirements for overriding a veto can vary depending on the jurisdiction and the nature of the veto power being exercised.

In conclusion, the US Constitution requires an extraordinary majority of two-thirds in both Houses of Congress to override a presidential veto. This provision ensures that the President's perspective is given significant weight and that any override has broad support. The "pocket veto" further highlights the importance of an extraordinary majority by preventing Congress from overriding a veto in certain circumstances. While the two-thirds majority is the standard requirement, variations exist at different levels of government, showcasing the dynamic nature of veto powers in the US political system.

To ratify treaties

The US Constitution requires an extraordinary majority to ratify treaties. Treaties are binding agreements between nations and become part of international law. They are also incorporated into US federal law. The Treaty Clause of the US Constitution establishes the procedure for ratifying international agreements. It empowers the President as the primary negotiator of agreements between the US and other countries.

The Constitution's framers gave the Senate a share of the treaty-making power to provide a check on presidential power and to safeguard the sovereignty of the states. The President can negotiate and sign treaties and then present them to the Senate for approval. The Senate can consent unconditionally, refuse consent, or stipulate conditions in the form of amendments or reservations. The Senate does not ratify treaties, but it does approve or reject a resolution of ratification. If the resolution passes, ratification takes place when the instruments of ratification are formally exchanged between the US and the foreign power(s).

The Senate's approval of a treaty requires a vote of two-thirds of the Senators present. This means that treaties must overcome political and partisan divisions to gain approval. The President then ratifies the treaty by signing an instrument of ratification and arranging for its deposit or exchange. However, the President has no obligation to ratify a Senate-approved treaty, and in some cases, the President has declined to do so.

In addition to the Treaty Clause, laws governing US foreign policy provide two other mechanisms for making international agreements: congressional-executive agreements and executive agreements. Congressional-executive agreements require simple majorities in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, followed by the signature of the President. Executive agreements are entered into unilaterally by the President pursuant to constitutional executive powers.

Frequently asked questions