Eleanor Finch
The Free Exercise Clause is one of two religious freedom clauses in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The clause was added in 1791 and prohibits government interference with religious belief and, within limits, religious practice. The Free Exercise Clause has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in various cases, including Cantwell v. Connecticut, Sherbert v. Verner, and Reynolds v. United States, shaping the understanding of religious freedom in the U.S.
| Characteristics | Values |
|---|---|
| Date added to the constitution | 1791 |
| Amendment | First Amendment |
| Prohibits | Government interference with religious belief and, within limits, religious practice |
| Protects | Right to freely practice one's preferred religion |
| Protects against | Government discrimination or abuse on the basis of religion |
| Does not require | Favorable government treatment of believers |
| Does not protect | Religious exemptions that excuse believers from complying with neutral and general laws that constrain the rest of society |
| Does not protect | The sacramental use of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, by members of the Native American Church |
| Does not protect | Polygamy |
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What You'll Learn
The Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause, on the other hand, prohibits the government from establishing or sponsoring a religion, taking sides in religious disputes, or favouring or disfavouring anyone based on religion or belief (or lack thereof). It ensures that the government remains neutral in matters of religion, neither promoting nor inhibiting any particular faith.
Together, these clauses ensure religious freedom and government neutrality towards religion. However, there has been debate and conflicting interpretations over the years regarding these clauses, with some arguing that they are inherently at odds with each other. The Supreme Court has played a pivotal role in interpreting and applying these clauses, with cases such as Reynolds v. United States in 1878, Sherbert v. Verner, and more recently, dramatic changes in First Amendment jurisprudence that have led to concerns about religious favouritism.
The Free Exercise Clause has been interpreted to require accommodation of religious conduct, except when the state demonstrates a compelling interest and no less burdensome means to achieve it. This compelling interest doctrine has seen fluctuation in its interpretation over time, with periods of broader and narrower applications. The Establishment Clause, meanwhile, has been the basis for prohibiting state-sponsored churches and ensuring that government assistance to religion is secular and does not promote or inhibit any faith.
In conclusion, the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause are fundamental components of the First Amendment, safeguarding religious freedom and government neutrality in the United States. Their interpretation and application by the Supreme Court have evolved over time, reflecting the complex nature of religious liberty issues in a diverse society.
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Religious freedom and the US Constitution
The Free Exercise Clause is one of two religious freedom clauses in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The other is the Establishment Clause. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government interference with religious belief and, within limits, religious practice. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause together read:
> Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...
The First Amendment was ratified in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights. At the time, the guarantee of religious free exercise was understood to protect against government discrimination or abuse on the basis of religion, but not to require favorable government treatment of believers. The Free Exercise Clause was also understood to protect against indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions.
The Supreme Court has historically left the question of religious exemptions to Congress and the state legislatures. The first judicially-ordered exemptions arose in the 1960s and early 1970s, when the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause required religious exemptions for Amish families who objected to sending their children to high school, and for employees who were denied unemployment benefits when they lost their jobs for refusing to work on their Sabbath.
The Supreme Court first interpreted the extent of the Free Exercise Clause in 1878 in Reynolds v. United States, relating to the prosecution of polygamy under federal law. The Court upheld Reynolds' conviction for bigamy, deciding that to do otherwise would provide constitutional protection for a gamut of religious beliefs, including those as extreme as human sacrifice.
The Supreme Court's interpretation and analysis of the Free Exercise Clause will continue to evolve as the nation grows.
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The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause of the US Constitution protects the "'free exercise of religion'". This clause safeguards an individual's liberty to practise and hold religious beliefs, prohibiting government interference. The Supreme Court has historically interpreted the clause in varying ways, from broad to narrow applications, with the first case involving the interpretation of the clause being Reynolds v. United States in 1878.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court strengthened the protection of religious conduct, interpreting the clause to protect individuals from generally applicable laws that burden religious exercise. This interpretation suggested that the government could not enforce religiously neutral laws unless there was a "compelling" public interest in doing so. This interpretation was reflected in cases such as Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), where Amish families were exempted from sending their children to school beyond the age of 14, and in Sherbert v. Verner, where the Court overturned a decision to deny unemployment benefits to a practising member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church who was forced out of her job due to her refusal to work on Saturdays.
However, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Court's interpretation began to narrow, as seen in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), where the Supreme Court upheld a state prohibition on the use of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug used in religious ceremonies. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not protect individuals from "valid and neutral laws of general applicability". This decision led to the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993, which attempted to restore the previous strict scrutiny test. Nevertheless, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck down the act as applied to the states, asserting that it unconstitutionally infringed on the Court's role in interpreting the Constitution.
More recently, in Tandon v. Newsom, the Supreme Court enjoined California from enforcing COVID-19 restrictions on private gatherings, including religious gatherings, arguing that the government regulations were not neutral and generally applicable, triggering strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. Additionally, in Carson v. Makin, the Court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause demands public funding of religious education, marking a significant shift in jurisprudence.
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Religious exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause, part of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, prohibits Congress from making laws that infringe on the free exercise of religion. The text of the First Amendment's two religion clauses states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof". The Free Exercise Clause thus guarantees freedom of religious belief and, within limits, religious practice.
The Free Exercise Clause is one of two religion clauses in the First Amendment, the other being the Establishment Clause, which prevents the federal government from establishing an official religion. Together, these clauses support religious freedom while maintaining a separation of church and state.
The Supreme Court has historically left the question of religious exemptions to Congress and the state legislatures. The first judicially-ordered exemptions arose in the 1960s and early 1970s, when the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause required religious exemptions for Amish families who objected to sending their children to high school, and for employees who were denied unemployment benefits when they lost their jobs for refusing to work on their Sabbath.
In 1972, the Supreme Court adopted a new standard of "strict scrutiny" in various areas of civil rights law, which it also applied to the First Amendment religion clauses. This standard interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to require accommodation of religious conduct unless a state could show a compelling interest and no less burdensome means to achieve that end. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court overturned the state Employment Security Commission's decision to deny unemployment benefits to a practicing member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church who was forced out of a job after her employer adopted a 6-day work week, which would have required her to work on Saturdays against the dictates of her religion.
However, the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause has evolved over time, and later decisions have reduced the scope of this interpretation. For instance, in Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not protect the sacramental use of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, by members of the Native American Church. This decision was controversial, and in 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to reinstate the pre-Smith compelling-interest test. The RFRA authorises courts to exempt a person from any law that imposes a substantial burden on sincere religious beliefs or actions, unless the government can show that the law is the “least restrictive means” of furthering a “compelling governmental interest”.
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The Free Exercise Clause and the First Amendment
The Free Exercise Clause, part of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, protects religious freedom. It states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof". This clause ensures that individuals are free to hold, practice, and change their beliefs according to their conscience without government interference. It also prevents Congress from burdening the free exercise of religion, protecting the right to practice one's preferred religion.
The Free Exercise Clause was added as part of the First Amendment in 1791. At the time, the understanding of religious free exercise was that it protected against government discrimination or abuse based on religion, but not to require favourable treatment for believers. The Supreme Court has historically left the question of religious exemptions to Congress and state legislatures.
The interpretation and application of the Free Exercise Clause by the Supreme Court have evolved over time. One of the first cases to closely examine the clause was Reynolds v. United States in 1878, which dealt with the prosecution of a polygamist under federal law and the defendant's claim of protection under the clause. The Court upheld the law and the prosecution, stating that allowing such an exemption would provide constitutional protection for a wide range of religious beliefs, including extreme practices like human sacrifice.
The Court has applied a "strict scrutiny" standard to the First Amendment religion clauses, requiring accommodation of religious conduct unless the state can show a compelling interest and no less burdensome means to achieve it. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court overturned a decision to deny unemployment benefits to a practicing member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church who lost her job due to her refusal to work on Saturdays, which was against her religious beliefs.
However, the Court has also clarified that religious actions can be regulated for the protection of society, as seen in Cantwell v. Connecticut. In this case, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause is enforceable against state and local governments, ensuring religious freedom across the nation. The interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause will continue to evolve as the nation grows and faces new challenges.
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Frequently asked questions
The Free Exercise Clause is part of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. It protects the right to religious practices and beliefs, forbidding Congress from prohibiting the free exercise of religion.
The Free Exercise Clause protects the right to hold religious beliefs and engage in religious practices. It also safeguards against government interference with religion, whether intentional or unintentional.
The Free Exercise Clause was added as part of the First Amendment in 1791.
The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are two religious freedom clauses in the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause prevents the federal government from establishing an official religion, while the Free Exercise Clause protects the free exercise of religion. Together, they support religious freedom while maintaining a separation of church and state.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause has evolved over time. In the 1960s, the Court adopted a broader view, upholding religious exemptions for Amish families regarding education and unemployment benefits. In cases like Sherbert v. Verner and Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court applied a "compelling interest" test, requiring the government to demonstrate a compelling secular interest and use the least restrictive means when infringing on religious practices.
