
The fighting words doctrine is a limitation to freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court first defined fighting words in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) as words that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Fighting words are not meant to continue a conversation or exchange ideas. They are intended to provoke a violent response beyond speech. The Court has continued to uphold the doctrine but has also narrowed the grounds on which fighting words are held to apply.
| Characteristics | Values |
|---|---|
| Definition | Words meant to incite violence and cause injury |
| Legal Standing | Not protected by the First Amendment |
| Face-to-face | Fighting words are generally directed at someone face-to-face |
| Intention | Intended to provoke a response beyond speech |
| Response | Fighting words may lead to a violent response |
| Behavior | Accompanying behavior may be considered |
| Context | Considered in the context of the whole situation |
| Tone | Tone alone is not enough to constitute fighting words |
| Audience | The makeup of the audience may be considered |
| Immediacy | Fighting words require immediacy and imminence |
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What You'll Learn

Fighting words are not meant to continue a conversation or exchange ideas
Fighting words are not meant to foster dialogue or the exchange of ideas. They are deliberately provocative and intended to incite a violent response. The concept of "fighting words" is an exception to the First Amendment's protection of free speech, allowing the government to restrict certain types of speech that are likely to provoke immediate violence or retaliation from those who hear it.
The phrase "fighting words" is often used in jest when someone insults something or someone we care about. However, the legal definition is much more serious and specific. The US Supreme Court first defined "fighting words" in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire in 1942, characterizing them as words that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." The Court clarified that such utterances are not a necessary part of any exchange of ideas and have little social value, with any potential benefit being outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
The Court has continued to uphold the doctrine while narrowing the grounds for its application. For instance, in Street v. New York (1969), the Court overturned a statute prohibiting flag-burning and verbally abusing the flag, asserting that mere offensiveness does not qualify as "fighting words." Similarly, in Cohen v. California (1971), wearing a jacket with a vulgar phrase was not considered uttering fighting words as it lacked personally abusive epithets. In Texas v. Johnson (1989), the Supreme Court redefined the scope of fighting words to mean "a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs," excluding symbolic speech acts like flag-burning.
Courts consider the entire situation when determining if words constitute "fighting words," including any accompanying behavior and whether they were said face-to-face. Using curse words or an angry tone alone is typically insufficient for an outburst to qualify as "fighting words." The speaker's intent and the likelihood of provoking unlawful physical retaliation are also taken into account.
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Fighting words are meant to inflict injury
The concept of "fighting words" is an exception to the freedom of speech granted by the First Amendment in the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court first defined "fighting words" in 1942 in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, where a Jehovah's Witness called a town marshal a "damned racketeer" and a "damned fascist" and was arrested. The court upheld the arrest, stating that "fighting words" are those that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace".
The Court has continued to uphold the "fighting words" doctrine but has narrowed the grounds on which it can be applied. For example, in Street v. New York (1969), the Court overturned a statute prohibiting flag-burning and verbally abusing the flag, holding that mere offensiveness does not qualify as "fighting words". Similarly, in Cohen v. California (1971), wearing a jacket that said "fuck the draft" was not considered "fighting words" as there were no "personally abusive epithets". In Texas v. Johnson (1989), the Court redefined the scope of "fighting words" to mean "a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs". This case also established that symbolic speech, such as flag burning, does not constitute "fighting words".
Courts decide if words are "fighting words" by considering the whole situation, including any accompanying behaviour and the context in which the words were used. They also look at the wording of the laws used to convict someone for using "fighting words" to ensure they align with the First Amendment. While the "fighting words" doctrine allows the government to limit speech, critics argue that the Court's continued narrowing of the doctrine has left it hollow.
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Fighting words are meant to incite violence
The concept of "fighting words" is an exception to the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment of the US Constitution. The US Supreme Court first defined "fighting words" in 1942 in the case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. In this case, the court said that fighting words are those that, by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. The court clarified that such words are not a necessary part of any exchange of ideas and have little social value.
The Court has continued to uphold the doctrine but has also narrowed the grounds for its application. For instance, in Street v. New York (1969), the Court overturned a statute prohibiting flag-burning and verbally abusing the flag, holding that mere offensiveness does not qualify as "fighting words". Similarly, in Cohen v. California (1971), wearing a jacket that said "fuck the draft" did not constitute fighting words as there were no "personally abusive epithets". In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), even speech such as "Bury the niggers" and "Send the Jews back to Israel" was held to be protected speech under the First Amendment as it did not incite or produce imminent lawless action.
Courts decide if words are fighting words that are not protected by the First Amendment or offensive speech that is protected by the law by considering the entire situation. For example, fighting words generally mean words said to someone face-to-face in a way that the average person would react to with violence. The use of curse words or an angry tone alone is not sufficient to constitute fighting words. Accompanying behavior and context are also considered.
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Fighting words are not protected by the First Amendment
The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, even if it is offensive. However, there are a few narrow exceptions, and one of them is "fighting words". The Supreme Court first defined "fighting words" in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire in 1942, when it ruled that such words are not protected by the First Amendment.
The Court defined "fighting words" as those that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace". In other words, fighting words are meant to provoke a violent response beyond speech, and are not meant to continue a conversation or exchange ideas. Justices Gummow and Hayne held that "abusive" and "insulting" words in certain contexts are so hurtful that they are intended to, or are likely to, provoke unlawful physical retaliation.
In the decades following Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court has decided several cases that further clarify what speech or actions constitute fighting words. For example, in Texas v. Johnson (1989), the Supreme Court redefined the scope of the fighting words doctrine to mean words that are "a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs". In this case, the Court held that burning the US flag, which was considered symbolic speech, did not constitute fighting words.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), the Supreme Court found that the "First Amendment prevents the government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed". Even if the words are considered fighting words, the First Amendment will still protect the speech if the restriction is based on viewpoint discrimination. For instance, in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, the Court held that cross burning is not fighting words without the intent to intimidate.
Courts decide if words are fighting words that are not protected by the First Amendment or offensive speech that is protected by the First Amendment by looking at the whole situation. Fighting words generally mean words said face-to-face in a way that the average person would react to with violence. Using curse words or an angry tone alone is not enough to make an outburst fighting words. Using racial slurs may or may not be fighting words, depending on the context.
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Fighting words are a direct personal insult
The concept of "fighting words" is an exception to the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment of the US Constitution. The Supreme Court first defined "fighting words" in 1942 in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, where a Jehovah's Witness called a town marshal a "damned racketeer" and a "damned fascist" and was arrested. The Court upheld the arrest, stating that "insulting or 'fighting words', those that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" are not protected by the First Amendment.
Since Chaplinsky, the Court has continued to uphold the doctrine but has also narrowed the grounds for what constitutes "fighting words." For instance, in Street v. New York (1969), the Court overturned a statute prohibiting flag-burning and verbally abusing the flag, holding that mere offensiveness does not qualify as "fighting words." Similarly, in Cohen v. California (1971), wearing a jacket that said "fuck the draft" was not considered uttering fighting words as it did not involve "personally abusive epithets."
The Supreme Court redefined the scope of "fighting words" in Texas v. Johnson (1989) to mean "a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs." In this case, the Court held that burning the US flag was not a direct personal insult and, therefore, did not constitute fighting words. This decision highlighted the importance of context and the directed nature of the speech or action in determining whether something qualifies as "fighting words."
In determining whether speech constitutes "fighting words," courts will consider the whole situation, including any accompanying behavior and the likelihood of provoking a violent response. Fighting words generally refer to words said face-to-face, and the average person's likely reaction is considered. While using curse words or an angry tone alone is not sufficient, racial slurs may constitute fighting words depending on the context. The courts also examine the wording of the laws used to convict someone for using fighting words to ensure alignment with the First Amendment.
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Frequently asked questions
Fighting words are words meant to incite violence and are not protected by the First Amendment as free speech.
The fighting words doctrine, an exception to First Amendment-protected speech, was first defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire in 1942. The Court held that fighting words are those that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
Examples of fighting words include "damned racketeer" and "damned fascist" from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, "mother fucking fascist" and "black mother fucking pig" from Brown v. Oklahoma, and "a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs" from Texas v. Johnson.
Mere offensiveness or abusive language does not qualify as fighting words. For example, in Street v. New York, the Court overturned a statute prohibiting flag-burning and verbally abusing the flag. In Cohen v. California, wearing a jacket that said "fuck the draft" was not considered fighting words as it did not involve personally abusive epithets.
Courts consider the context and content of the speech, as well as any accompanying behavior, to determine if words are fighting words. They also look at the laws used to convict someone for fighting words to ensure they align with the First Amendment.


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