Sunni Iraqis' Opposition To The New Constitution Explained

why were many sunni iraqis opposed to the new constitution

The new constitution of Iraq was approved in 2005, despite strong opposition from the country's Sunni Arab community. The Sunni Arabs boycotted the January 2005 election, which resulted in low Sunni representation in the drafting of the constitution. The rushed constitutional process, exclusion from negotiations, and the prospect of a southern, predominantly Shia, federal region were some of the reasons for Sunni opposition. The Sunnis also protested the influence of the United States in the constitutional process and the stronger Shia and Kurdish groups. The Sunni negotiators rejected the draft constitution, stating that they did not reach a consensus, which would render the draft illegitimate.

Characteristics Values
Sunni Arabs constitute a majority in at least three Iraqi governorates Anbar, Salahaddin, and Ninevah
Sunni turnout in the January 2005 election As low as 2% in Anbar province
Sunni negotiators rejected the draft constitution Rejected paragraphs in the draft on which no consensus was reached
Sunni Arabs opposed The regional federalist model for Iraq and the prospect of a southern, predominantly Shia, federal region
Sunni Arabs rejected the constitution by wide margins 96.96% and 81.75% of voters from Sunni-dominated Anbar and Salahaddin governorates voted no
Sunni Arabs could have blocked the draft constitution If unified behind a 'no' vote campaign
Sunnis boycotted two votes One for parliamentary seats and one to ratify the constitution
Sunnis did not participate in the constitution-drafting process Minimal say in Iraq's new preeminent and supreme law
Sunnis denounced the constitution Protesting the way it was drafted and the way stronger and larger Shiite and Kurdish groups pushed the draft document through

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Sunni Arabs boycotted the election, resulting in a lack of representation in the constitutional process

The Sunni boycott of the election was driven by several factors. One reason was the perception that the constitutional process was rushed, hindering emerging confidence in an Iraqi federal model and amplifying imbalances in negotiating competencies. The strong presence and influence of the United States in the constitutional process also contributed to the Sunni boycott, as some Sunnis opposed the US presence in Iraq and felt that their participation exacerbated this issue.

Additionally, Sunni Arabs objected to the regional federalist model proposed in the draft constitution, particularly the prospect of a southern, predominantly Shia, federal region. Secular and religious Sunni Arab groups were divided over the statement in the draft that "Islam is a fundamental source of legislation." Secularists believed this injected too much religion into the constitution, while clerics thought it did not go far enough.

The Sunni boycott resulted in a lack of proportional representation for Sunnis in the Iraqi constitution and the transitional national assembly. This contributed to the ongoing struggle for the Sunni community to re-engage with the central government and inhibited the formation of interethnic and intersectarian alliances.

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The constitution was drafted by Shias and Kurds, excluding Sunni views

The Iraqi constitution was drafted by Shia and Kurdish groups, with Sunnis boycotting the process. The Sunnis' lack of participation in the constitution-drafting process meant that they had minimal say in Iraq’s new preeminent and supreme law. The Sunnis' absence was due to several factors, including the rushed constitutional process, which hindered Sunni Arabs' emerging confidence in an Iraqi federal model, and the strong influence of Shia and Kurdish groups, who pushed the draft document through.

The Shia and Kurdish groups had a significant advantage in numbers and influence, with the Shia community compelled to follow Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s ruling that it was their "duty" to participate in the process. The Kurds, on the other hand, viewed the constitution ratification vote through the prism of independence. This unity and strength of the Shia and Kurdish groups intimidated Sunni negotiators, who rejected the draft constitution and did not endorse the document.

The Sunnis' opposition to the constitution was not uniform, with secular and religious groups divided on specific issues. However, common themes emerged, such as objections to the regional federalist model for Iraq and the prospect of a southern, predominantly Shia, federal region. The Sunnis' boycott of the process and their subsequent opposition to the constitution highlighted the deepening sectarian splits in post-2003 Iraq and the emergence of identity politics.

The exclusion of Sunni views in the constitution-drafting process was a significant missed opportunity to build new institutional legitimacy and foster interethnic and intersectarian alliances in Iraq. The resulting constitution, which was approved by a national referendum, further alienated the Sunni community and contributed to the Sunnis' predicament of being estranged in their own country. The Sunnis' lack of representation and influence in the constitution-drafting process had lasting implications for Iraq's political landscape and the relationship between its religious and ethnic communities.

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Sunnis opposed the regional federalist model, particularly a southern Shia federal region

The Sunni Arabs in Iraq generally opposed the new constitution, with 96.96% and 81.75% of voters from the Sunni-dominated Anbar and Salahaddin governorates voting against it. The Sunnis opposed the regional federalist model, particularly a southern Shia federal region.

The Sunnis' opposition to the constitution was due to both procedural complaints of exclusion from the negotiations and major substantive objections. The constitutional committee broke the law several times and was unable to achieve consensus, despite guarantees made to bring the Sunni community into the process. The Sunnis also boycotted the January election, reducing their representation in the constitutional process. The rushed constitutional process hindered Sunni Arabs' emerging confidence in an Iraqi federal model.

The Sunnis objected to the prospect of a southern, predominantly Shia, federal region. They saw this as a threat to their interests and influence in the country. The Sunnis also had concerns about the statement in the draft constitution that "Islam is a fundamental source of legislation". Secularists thought this was too much religion, while clerics thought it was not enough.

The Sunnis' opposition to the constitution and their protests against it were well-known. Sunni negotiators rejected the draft constitution and did not endorse the document. They argued that the paragraphs on which they did not reach consensus rendered the draft illegitimate. The Sunnis also had concerns about the increasing influence of the United States in Iraqi politics and the emergence of identity politics, with divisions based on social components of society.

The Sunnis' opposition to the constitution and their minimal participation in the process contributed to their sense of estrangement in their own country. They felt excluded by the Shia and Kurdish groups, who were seen as pushing the draft document through. The Sunnis also had concerns about the central government's overcentralization and oppression, and the tendency to link them with the Islamic State, which has inhibited their reengagement with the government.

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Sunnis were concerned about the wording that cites Islam as a source of legislation

The Sunnis' opposition to the new constitution was due to a combination of factors, including their dissatisfaction with the drafting process, their concerns about representation, and their views on the role of Islam in legislation.

One of the main concerns of Sunni Iraqis regarding the new constitution was the wording that cites Islam as a source of legislation. While some Sunni groups wanted Islam to have a more prominent role in the constitution, others felt that the current wording introduced too much religion into the document. This disagreement highlights the internal divisions within the Sunni community, with secularists and religious groups holding differing opinions.

The Sunni negotiators' rejection of the constitution was influenced by their concerns about the statement regarding Islam as a fundamental source of legislation. This issue became a point of contention, with some Sunnis arguing that the constitution should reflect a stronger Islamic influence. However, it is important to note that the Sunni community itself was not unified in its stance, as evidenced by the varying levels of support and opposition across different Sunni-dominated governorates.

The Sunni community's opposition to the constitution was further influenced by their concerns about representation and the drafting process. The low Sunni turnout in the January election and their minimal involvement in the constitution-drafting process led to a perception that their views were not adequately represented. This contributed to a sense of exclusion and dissatisfaction with the final document.

Additionally, the Sunnis' complex political landscape, including the emergence of identity politics and the impact of sectarian splits, influenced their stance on the constitution. The post-2003 period in Iraq witnessed the militarization of sectarian divisions, which further complicated the internal dynamics within the Sunni community. These divisions were often exploited by external influences, such as the United States, contributing to the Sunnis' distrust and opposition to the constitution.

In conclusion, the Sunnis' concerns about the wording regarding Islam as a source of legislation were just one aspect of their broader objections to the new constitution. Their opposition was shaped by a combination of factors, including procedural complaints, representation concerns, and internal divisions within the Sunni community itself.

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Sunnis felt persecuted by the central government and feared allegations of connections to the Islamic State

The Sunnis in Iraq have had a troubled relationship with the central government, and their opposition to the new constitution stems from a range of factors, including feelings of persecution and fears of allegations of connections to the Islamic State.

The Sunnis' boycott of the January 2005 election meant that they had minimal representation in the constitution-drafting process, and their views were not adequately reflected in the final document. This boycott was partly due to the perception that the US was too involved in Iraqi politics, with one commentator noting that the "ubiquitous presence" of US negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad was "destructive". The Sunnis' absence from the political process meant that they were not proportionally represented in the Iraqi constitution or the transitional national assembly.

The Sunnis' opposition to the constitution was also influenced by their concerns about the increasing influence of Shia and Kurdish groups. The Shia community, compelled by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s ruling, actively participated in the political process, and the Kurds viewed the constitution through the prism of independence. The Sunnis felt that these groups had too much power and influence in the drafting of the constitution, and that their own interests were not being adequately represented.

Furthermore, the Sunnis in Iraq have had to deal with the perception that they are linked to the Islamic State (IS). This association has made it difficult for them to reengage with the central government, as they fear that allegations of connections to IS will be used to persecute them without due process. The Sunnis' opposition to the Islamic State is well-known, but the community recognises that it is hard to find a tribe that has not had members affiliated with the organisation. This complex situation has contributed to the Sunnis' feelings of estrangement in their own country.

The Sunnis' concerns about persecution and allegations of IS connections are not unfounded. During the post-Saddam period, many sheikhs who held senior positions in the former regime’s security or political apparatus were now considered enemies of the new state. This shift in power dynamics contributed to a crisis of legitimacy over who constituted a tribal leader, further alienating the Sunni community.

The Sunnis' opposition to the new constitution in Iraq is, therefore, multifaceted and deeply rooted in their feelings of persecution and fears of allegations. Their boycott of the political process and concerns about Shia and Kurdish influence, combined with the perception of links to the Islamic State, have all contributed to their estrangement and opposition to the central government.

Frequently asked questions

Sunni Iraqis boycotted the vote on the new constitution due to a lack of representation in the constitution-drafting process, which resulted in their minimal say in Iraq's new supreme law.

Sunni Arabs objected to the regional federalist model for Iraq and, in particular, the prospect of a southern, predominantly Shia, federal region. They also believed that the rushed constitutional process hindered their emerging confidence in an Iraqi federal model.

Yes, influential secular and religious Sunni Arab political groups, including the Iraq Islamic Party, the National Dialogue Council, and the Muslim Scholars Association, opposed the draft at the national referendum. In addition, some women's groups, the parties of Ayad Allawi and Moqtada Al-Sadr, and ethnic minority groups also opposed the draft.

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