Jonah Patel
The Extradition Clause, also referred to as the Interstate Rendition Clause, is a provision in the US Constitution that normalizes legal processes among the states. It is part of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, which outlines the relationships between the states and includes requirements for interstate extradition. The Extradition Clause specifically addresses situations where a person charged with a crime in one state flees to another state. In such cases, the clause requires that the fugitive be returned to the charging state upon the demand of the executive authority of that state. The clause has been the subject of several Supreme Court cases, including Kentucky v. Dennison in the 19th century and Puerto Rico v. Branstad in 1987, which have clarified its interpretation and enforcement.
| Characteristics | Values |
|---|---|
| Name | Extradition Clause, Interstate Rendition Clause |
| Location | Article IV, Section 2 |
| Summary | A person charged with a crime in one state who flees to another state must be returned to the original state upon demand |
| Implementation | Not self-executing; requires additional legislation |
| Legislation | Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182, UCEA (except in South Carolina and Missouri) |
| Supreme Court Cases | Kentucky v. Dennison, Puerto Rico v. Branstad, California v. Superior Court, Michigan v. Doran |
| Defenses | Validity of request documents, accuracy of charges and identity, habeas corpus petition |
Explore related products
![Constitutional Law [Connected eBook with Study Center] (Aspen Casebook)](https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/61qrQ6YZVOL._AC_UY218_.jpg)
$17.36 $24.95
![International and Transnational Criminal Law: [Connected eBook with Study Center] (Aspen Casebook)](https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/613ybeTWhxL._AC_UY218_.jpg)
What You'll Learn
Extradition Clause (Article IV, Section 2)
The Extradition Clause, also known as the Interstate Rendition Clause, is outlined in Article IV, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. It provides for the extradition of an accused criminal back to the state where they allegedly committed a crime. This clause applies when an individual is charged with a crime in one state and then flees to another.
The Extradition Clause states: "A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime." In other words, if a person is accused of a crime and flees to another state, the governor of the state where the crime was committed can demand their return, and the fugitive state must comply.
The clause was included in the Constitution to normalize legal processes among the states. It is similar to a provision in the Articles of Confederation, which stated that: "If any Person guilty of, or charged with, treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any state, shall flee from Justice, and be found in any of the united states, he shall upon demand of the Governor or executive power of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, and removed to the state having jurisdiction of his offence."
The Extradition Clause was first tested in the Supreme Court case of Kentucky v. Dennison (1860/1861). In this case, a man named Willis Lago was wanted in Kentucky for helping a slave girl escape. He fled to Ohio, where the governor, William Dennison, Jr., refused to extradite him back to Kentucky. The Supreme Court ruled that while it was the duty of a governor to return a fugitive to the state where the crime was committed, they could not be compelled to do so through a writ of mandamus (a court order). This greatly mitigated the power of the Extradition Clause.
Nevada Workplaces: Understanding Hostile Environment Laws
You may want to see also
Fugitive Slave Clause
The Fugitive Slave Clause, also known as the Slave Clause or the Fugitives From Labour Clause, is Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution. It requires that a "Person held to Service or Labour" (usually a slave, apprentice, or indentured servant) who escapes to another state must be returned to their master in the state from which they fled. The clause states:
> No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which abolished slavery except as punishment for criminal acts, has rendered the Fugitive Slave Clause mostly irrelevant. However, it is worth noting that the Fugitive Slave Clause did not use the words "slave" or "slavery", and modern legal scholars debate whether it conferred constitutional legitimacy on slavery. Some argue that its vague wording was a political compromise that avoided overtly validating slavery at the federal level, while others contend it functionally entrenched slaveholder power.
The Fugitive Slave Clause was added to the Constitution at the insistence of Southern delegates, and it was unanimously approved by the Convention without further debate. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which abolished slavery in the Territory, provided for the return of fugitive slaves who escaped there. The enforcement provisions of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 were strengthened as part of the Compromise of 1850, and Northern resistance to its enforcement increased steadily in the 19th century, especially after this Act. Several Northern states enacted "personal liberty laws" to protect free Black residents from kidnapping and provide procedural safeguards for accused fugitives.
The Supreme Court interpreted the Fugitive Slave Clause as giving the owner of an enslaved person the same right to seize and repossess them in another state as the local laws of their own state granted to them. State laws that penalised such a seizure were deemed unconstitutional, and states had no concurrent power to legislate on the subject.
The Judicial Branch: Constitutional Powers Explained
You may want to see also
Kentucky v. Dennison (1860/1861)
The Extradition Clause, also known as the Interstate Rendition Clause, is Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. It provides for the extradition of an accused criminal back to the state where they allegedly committed a crime. The clause applies to a person accused of a crime in one state who flees to another.
When Chase left office in 1860, Magoffin renewed the requisition with the new Ohio governor, William Dennison, who also refused to comply. Magoffin then sought a writ of mandamus to force Dennison to extradite Lago, suing in the United States Supreme Court under the court's original jurisdiction for cases between two states. The case presented a dilemma for Chief Justice Roger B. Taney. The court ruled that while it was the duty of a governor to return a fugitive to the state where the crime was committed, a governor could not be compelled through a writ of mandamus to do so. This decision was based on the allegation that the offence charged in the Kentucky indictment was not a crime according to the Constitution, and therefore, there was no obligation to deliver Lago back to Kentucky.
The decision in Kentucky v. Dennison was later reversed in 1987 in Puerto Rico v. Branstad. In this case, an Iowan man struck and killed a pregnant woman in Puerto Rico, then fled back to his home state of Iowa. The governor of Puerto Rico requested that Iowa return the fugitive, but the governor of Iowa refused. The Supreme Court held that the decision in Kentucky v. Dennison was outdated and no longer applicable, and Iowa was required to return the man to Puerto Rico.
Executive Power: Impacts and Influence on Our Lives
You may want to see also
Explore related products
Puerto Rico v. Branstad (1987)
In 1981, Ronald Calder, an Iowa native and an air traffic controller in Puerto Rico, struck and killed one person and injured another with his vehicle. He was charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder and was released on $5,000 bail. Calder failed to appear at subsequent hearings, and he was declared a fugitive from justice.
Believing that Calder had returned to his family in Iowa, Puerto Rico officials contacted local authorities, and Calder surrendered. In May 1981, the Governor of Puerto Rico submitted a request to the Governor of Iowa, Robert D. Ray, for Calder's extradition. After a hearing, and following unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a reduction in charges, Governor Ray denied the extradition request in December 1981. Another extradition request was made to Ray's successor, Terry Branstad, but it was also denied.
In February 1984, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, seeking a declaration that the failure to deliver Calder upon presentation of proper extradition papers violated the Extradition Clause and the Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182. The District Court dismissed the complaint, citing the precedent set by Kentucky v. Dennison, which held that federal courts could not issue writs of mandamus to compel governors to comply with the Extradition Clause.
The case, Puerto Rico v. Branstad, eventually reached the United States Supreme Court in 1987. The Court reversed its previous position, holding that the decision in Kentucky v. Dennison was outdated and no longer applicable. The Court established the power of federal courts to enforce both the Extradition Clause and the Extradition Act by writs of mandamus. The Extradition Clause, found in Article IV of the Constitution, requires that if a person is charged with a crime in one state and flees to another, the harbouring state must return the individual to the charging state. The Extradition Act, passed by Congress, requires the governor of each state to deliver fugitives from justice found in their state upon lawful demand from another state.
Following the ruling, Calder voluntarily returned to Puerto Rico in September 1987. The original charges were dismissed, and he pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and attempted manslaughter. He was given suspended sentences and permitted to return to Iowa on probation.
How the 1917 Constitution Shaped Mexico's Future
You may want to see also
Defenses to Extradition
The Extradition Clause in the US Constitution requires states, upon demand of another state, to deliver a fugitive from justice who has committed a "treason, felony or other crime" to the state from which the fugitive has fled. The Extradition Clause governs interstate extradition in the United States, and federal extradition laws outline the procedures that states must follow to request and facilitate the extradition of a person.
While there are few defenses to extradition, individuals facing extradition may challenge the process in court. Here are some potential defenses to extradition:
Identity Challenges
The individual may argue that they are not the person named in the extradition request. This defense was recognized in Kentucky v. Dennison, where the Supreme Court held that the Extradition Clause's commands are mandatory.
Procedural Defects
The defense may challenge flaws in the paperwork or argue that the requesting state has not complied with the necessary legal procedures. For example, in Puerto Rico v. Branstad, the governor of Puerto Rico requested that Iowa return a fugitive who had fled the territory after striking pedestrians. The governor of Iowa initially refused, citing the precedent set in Kentucky v. Dennison. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the governor of Iowa had to comply with the Extradition Clause.
Lack of Probable Cause
If there is no valid probable cause for the charges, extradition may be contested. The Sixth Amendment requires that states notify the fugitive of the nature and cause of the accusation.
Habeas Corpus
The offender can still fight extradition by filing a writ of habeas corpus, which tests the legality of their detention by the government. If the court grants the habeas corpus petition, it will release the fugitive. If the petition is denied, the original state will arrange to transport them back to the demanding state.
Treaty Exceptions
Petitioners in extradition cases may argue that the alleged crime constitutes political behavior subject to exception or that the extradition treaty is not in force. Additionally, they may argue that the extradition procedure does not comply with the Constitution or that the relator has not been formally charged.
The Fundamentals of a Constitution
You may want to see also
Frequently asked questions
The Extradition Clause, also known as the Interstate Rendition Clause, is part of Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. It states that if a person is charged with a crime in one state and then flees to another, the latter state must return the individual to the charging state.
Kentucky v. Dennison (1860/1861) is a significant case that tested the meaning of the Extradition Clause. It involved a man who helped a slave escape and then fled to another state. The Court ruled that the governor of the second state had a constitutional responsibility to return the man, but could not be compelled through a writ of mandamus to do so. In 1987, the Court reversed this decision in Puerto Rico v. Branstad, holding that federal courts could enforce extraditions.
There are limited defences against extradition, but the Supreme Court has identified a few, including:
- Whether the extradition request documents are in order
- Whether the demanding state has charged the person with a crime
- Whether the person named in the request is the person charged with the crime
- Whether the petitioner is actually a fugitive from the requesting state
