Eleanor Finch
The Extradition Clause, also known as the Interstate Rendition Clause, is found in Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. This clause addresses the extradition of accused criminals back to the state where they allegedly committed a crime. It states that if a person is charged with a crime in one state and flees to another, the harbouring state must return the individual to the charging state upon demand. The Extradition Clause was included in the Constitution due to its separation from international extradition, and it has been the subject of several Supreme Court cases, including Kentucky v. Dennison in 1861 and Puerto Rico v. Branstad in 1987, which have interpreted and enforced its provisions.
| Characteristics | Values |
|---|---|
| Name | Extradition Clause or Interstate Rendition Clause |
| Location | Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 |
| Function | Provides for the extradition of an accused criminal back to the state where they allegedly committed a crime |
| Scope | Applies to a person accused of a crime in one state who flees to another state |
| Implementation | The Constitution does not grant Congress the power to implement it, so the Extradition Act was passed, requiring the governor of each state to deliver fugitives from justice found in their state upon lawful demand |
| Limitations | The duty to surrender fugitives is not absolute; if the laws of the state to which the fugitive has fled have been put in force against them, the demands of those laws may take precedence |
| Judicial interpretation | The Supreme Court has held that legislative extensions of the Extradition Clause are permissible |
| Notable cases | Kentucky v. Dennison (1861), Puerto Rico v. Branstad (1987) |
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What You'll Learn
The Extradition Clause is Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the US Constitution
The Extradition Clause, also known as the Interstate Rendition Clause, is Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the US Constitution. It states that a person charged with a crime who flees the state in which the crime was committed and is found in another state must be returned to the state with jurisdiction over the crime. This clause was included in the Constitution because the founders believed that interstate rendition was distinct from international extradition.
The Extradition Clause was first tested in the Supreme Court case of Kentucky v. Dennison (1861). In this case, a man named Willis Lago was accused of helping a slave girl escape in Kentucky and had fled to Ohio. The governor of Ohio, William Dennison, Jr., refused to extradite Lago back to Kentucky, and the Supreme Court ruled that while it was the duty of a governor to return a fugitive to the state where the crime occurred, a governor could not be compelled by a writ of mandamus to do so.
The Extradition Clause is not self-executing, and the Constitution does not grant Congress express power to enforce it. However, Congress passed the Extradition Act, which requires the governor of each state to deliver fugitives from justice found in their state upon lawful demand from another state. This Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3182 and extends beyond the terms of the Extradition Clause by requiring the rendition of fugitives at the request of a demanding territory or state.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutional validity of the Extradition Act in cases such as New York ex rel Kopel v. Bingham (1909) and Puerto Rico v. Branstad (1987). In the latter case, the Court reversed its decision in Kentucky v. Dennison, holding that courts have the power to enforce the Extradition Clause.
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The Clause is not self-executing
The Extradition Clause, or Interstate Rendition Clause, is Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. It provides for the extradition of an accused criminal back to the state where they allegedly committed a crime. However, the Clause is not self-executing, and the Constitution does not grant Congress the power to implement it. This means that the Clause itself does not have the force of law and requires additional legislation to be enacted in order to be enforced.
The non-self-executing nature of the Extradition Clause was a concern for Congress, which passed the first rendition act in 1793. This act, now found under 18 U.S.C. § 3182, is known as the Extradition Act and requires the governor of each state to deliver up fugitives from justice found in their state upon lawful demand from another state. This act ensures that the Clause can be enforced and that accused criminals can be extradited to the state where they allegedly committed a crime.
The Extradition Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court, which has accepted its contemporaneous construction as establishing its constitutional validity. In New York ex rel Kopel v. Bingham (1909), the Court held that the legislative extension of the Extradition Act to demanding territories, in addition to states, was permissible. This decision was affirmed in Puerto Rico v. Branstad (1987), where the Court accepted the constitutional validity of the legislation.
The Extradition Clause and the Extradition Act normalise legal processes among the states and ensure that accused criminals cannot evade justice by fleeing to another state. By providing a mechanism for extradition, the Clause and the Act promote cooperation and consistency in the administration of justice across state lines. This helps to ensure that individuals are held accountable for their actions, regardless of where the alleged crime took place.
In conclusion, while the Extradition Clause is not self-executing, Congress has addressed this through the passage of the Extradition Act. This legislation ensures that the Clause can be effectively enforced and that the administration of justice is consistent across the United States. The Supreme Court has affirmed the validity of this legislation, providing clarity and certainty in the application of the Extradition Clause.
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The First Extradition Act was passed in 1793
The Extradition Clause, or Interstate Rendition Clause, is Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. It states that a person charged with a crime who flees from one state to another must be returned to the state where the crime was committed. The clause was included in the Constitution due to fears that interstate rendition was separate from international extradition.
The Extradition Clause was first tested in the Supreme Court case of Kentucky v. Dennison (1861). In this case, a man named Willis Lago was wanted in Kentucky for helping a slave escape. He fled to Ohio, and the governor of Ohio refused to extradite him back to Kentucky. The Supreme Court ruled that while it was the duty of a governor to return a fugitive to the state where the crime was committed, a governor could not be compelled to do so through a writ of mandamus.
The Supreme Court reversed its decision in the case of Puerto Rico v. Branstad (1987). In this case, an Iowa man struck and killed a pregnant woman in Puerto Rico and then fled back to Iowa. The governor of Puerto Rico requested that Iowa extradite the man, and the Supreme Court ruled that Iowa was obligated to return the fugitive to Puerto Rico. This case gave courts the power to enforce the Extradition Clause.
The United States has extradition treaties with 116 countries, the first of which was with Ecuador in 1873. Extradition between countries is typically regulated by these treaties, which specify the crimes that are extraditable and the procedures to be followed. Extradition acts as a cooperative law enforcement procedure between jurisdictions, with the requesting state making a formal request for the return of a fugitive.
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Kentucky v. Dennison (1861) was the first test of the Clause
The Extradition Clause, also known as the Interstate Rendition Clause, is Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. It provides for the extradition of an accused criminal back to the state where they allegedly committed a crime.
The Supreme Court ruled that while it was the duty of a governor to return a fugitive to the state where the crime was committed, a governor could not be compelled through a writ of mandamus to do so. In other words, the Court held that the Extradition Clause's commands are mandatory and afford no discretion to executive officers of the asylum state. However, the federal courts had no authority under the Constitution to compel state officials to deliver up fugitives from justice.
In 1987, the Court reversed its decision under Dennison. The case involved an Iowan, Ronald Calder, who struck a married couple in Puerto Rico, resulting in the death of the wife, who was eight months pregnant. Calder was charged with murder and let out on bail. While on bail, he fled to his home state of Iowa. The Governor of Puerto Rico requested that Iowa extradite Calder, but the Governor of Iowa refused, citing the precedent set in Kentucky v. Dennison. The Supreme Court overruled its existing precedent, holding that federal courts did have the power to enforce a writ of mandamus and that Kentucky v. Dennison was outdated.
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The Clause applies to accused criminals who flee to another state
The Extradition Clause, also known as the Interstate Rendition Clause, is Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. It applies to accused criminals who flee to another state. The Clause states that:
> A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
This means that if someone is accused or charged with a crime in one state and then flees to another, the governor of the state where the crime was committed can demand their return, and the other state must comply. The Clause was included in the Constitution as the founders believed that interstate rendition was separate from international extradition, and it has been upheld by the Supreme Court in cases such as Kentucky v. Dennison (1861) and Puerto Rico v. Branstad (1987).
The Extradition Clause is not self-executing, and the Constitution does not grant Congress express power to implement it. However, the Second Congress passed a law, known as the Extradition Act, which requires the governor of each state to hand over fugitives from justice found in their state upon lawful demand from another state. This Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3182 and extends beyond the terms of the Extradition Clause by requiring the rendition of fugitives at the request of a demanding territory as well as a state.
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Frequently asked questions
The Extradition Clause, also known as the Interstate Rendition Clause, is found in Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the US Constitution.
The Extradition Clause states that a person charged with a crime who flees from one state to another must be returned to the state where the crime was committed.
No, the Extradition Clause is not self-executing, and the US Constitution does not grant Congress the power to implement it.
The Extradition Clause was included in the US Constitution due to the founders' understanding that interstate rendition was separate from international extradition. The Second Congress passed the first rendition act in 1793, now found under 18 U.S.C. § 3182, to ensure the implementation of the clause.
Yes, there are several notable court cases that have interpreted and applied the Extradition Clause. One of the earliest cases is Kentucky v. Dennison (1861), where the Supreme Court ruled that a governor had a duty to return a fugitive but could not be compelled through a writ of mandamus to do so. In 1987, the Court reversed its decision in Puerto Rico v. Branstad, where it held that courts have the power to enforce the Extradition Clause.
