Isabella Carter
The United States Constitution, specifically Article I, outlines the powers granted to Congress and those that are denied. While legislative powers are vested in Congress, consisting of the Senate and House of Representatives, there are explicit limitations in place to protect citizens' rights and maintain a balance of power. These limitations include the prohibition on suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus, passing bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, imposing certain taxes, and engaging in specific actions without the consent of Congress, such as declaring war or keeping troops in peacetime. The Constitution also includes the Port Preference Clause, preventing Congress from favoring the ports of one state over another in commercial or trade regulations. These restrictions ensure that Congress operates within defined boundaries, safeguarding the rights and liberties of US citizens.
| Characteristics | Values |
|---|---|
| Powers denied to Congress | Writ of Habeas Corpus |
| Bills of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Laws | |
| Export Taxes | |
| Port Preference Clause | |
| Regulating the slave trade (until 1808) | |
| Imposing direct taxes (until 1913) | |
| Granting titles of nobility |
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What You'll Learn
Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus is a procedural device that allows prisoners to challenge their imprisonment in a court of law. The term habeas corpus translates to "produce the body", and the writ's purpose is to test the legality of a prisoner's detention, rather than their guilt or innocence. The writ of habeas corpus is a flexible instrument that can be used to obtain release from illegal custody.
The writ of habeas corpus was first established by statute in the Judiciary Act of 1789. This statutory writ applied to those who were in custody under the authority of the United States, were committed for trial before a court, or were necessary to be brought into court to testify. The writ of habeas corpus was the only means for judicial review of federal capital convictions until 1889 and for other "infamous crimes" until 1891. It was also the only way for the Supreme Court to review decisions of military courts until the Military Justice Act of 1983.
The Suspension Clause of Article One of the US Constitution prohibits Congress from suspending the writ of habeas corpus. However, there have been instances where presidents have suspended the writ during wartime, such as during the Civil War and World War II. In recent times, there have been attempts to suspend the writ after the 9/11 attacks, but these were overturned by the Supreme Court.
The writ of habeas corpus has been expanded and narrowed over time. Following the Civil War, Congress expanded the writ to allow habeas relief to state prisoners if they were held in custody in violation of federal law. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 narrowed the writ by imposing a one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions and requiring approval for successive petitions. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 further narrowed the scope of habeas relief for prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay, requiring them to go through military commissions before seeking appeal. However, the Supreme Court has affirmed the right to habeas corpus, even for enemy combatants.
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Bills of Attainder
The US Constitution prohibits Congress from issuing "bills of attainder". This is to ensure the separation of powers and protect citizens against potential abuses of government power. The Constitution only permits the judiciary to determine whether someone is guilty or innocent, and the Bill of Attainder Clause acts as a safeguard against trial by legislature.
The Bill of Attainder Clause has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to ban legislation that imposes punishment on specific persons or groups without a trial. This includes the death sentence, confiscation of property, or other forms of punishment. The Court has emphasised that legislation does not violate the Bill of Attainder Clause simply because it places legal burdens on specific individuals or groups.
In the 1965 case United States v. Brown, the Court held that a federal statute making it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer of a labor union was a bill of attainder. The Court explained that the clause was intended as an implementation of the separation of powers and a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function. The Court concluded that Congress had exceeded its authority in enacting the statute because it designated specific individuals and imposed criminal liability on them, rather than creating generally applicable rules for courts to apply.
In another case, United States v. Lovett, the Supreme Court struck down an appropriations bill that cut off the pay of certain named federal employees accused of being subversives. The Court explained that the legislation effectively declared these individuals guilty of a crime without a trial, which violated the Bill of Attainder Clause.
The prohibition against bills of attainder also applies to state governments. The Constitution includes two separate clauses banning enactment of bills of attainder by the federal government and the states. State bills of attainder are considered permissible because there is no entrenched separation of powers at the state level. However, any state law that prevents a state court from functioning as a Chapter III court, which exercises power derived from the Constitution's chapter providing for judicial power, is unconstitutional.
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Ex Post Facto Laws
In the 1798 case of Calder v. Bull, the Court outlined four ways in which a legislature may violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses' prohibition on imposing retroactive criminal liability:
- Making criminal an action taken before enactment of the law that was lawful when it was done
- Increasing the severity of an offense after it was committed
- Increasing the punishment for a crime after it was committed
- Altering the rules of evidence after an offense was committed so that it is easier to convict an offender
In some nations that follow the Westminster system of government, ex post facto laws may be possible because the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy allows Parliament to pass any law it wishes within legal constraints. In nations with an entrenched bill of rights or a written constitution, ex post facto legislation may be prohibited or allowed, and this provision may be general or specific. For example, Article 29 of the Constitution of Albania explicitly allows retroactive effect for laws that alleviate possible punishments.
In civil matters, such as taxation, ex post facto laws may be made in some circumstances. However, in the United States, ex post facto laws are prohibited by the Constitution, and Congress does not have the power to pass such laws.
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Export Taxes
The powers denied to Congress are found in the US Constitution's Article I, Section 9, which contains a list of powers that Congress does not have. One of these limitations is the power to tax exports.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the US Constitution, also known as the Taxing and Spending Clause, grants Congress the power to tax. This clause permits the levying of taxes for two purposes: to pay off US federal debts and to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the country.
However, Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the Constitution explicitly states that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State". This provision was included to protect the southern states during the Constitutional Convention.
Despite this, Congress may still tax goods that are not in transit but are intended for export, as long as the tax is not imposed solely because the good will be exported. For example, a tax on all medical supplies would be constitutional, even if some of those supplies are exported.
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Port Preference Clause
Article I, Section 9, Clause 6 of the US Constitution, also known as the Port Preference Clause, prohibits Congress from passing any commercial or trade regulations that favour the ports of one state over another state's ports. This clause was written to prevent Congress from discriminating against certain states or regions. It ensures that ships travelling from one port to another are not required to stop and pay duties in a third location.
The Port Preference Clause is rarely litigated and largely neglected in legal scholarship. However, it has been invoked in a handful of court cases, including Williams v. United States (1921), Louisiana PSC v. Texas & N.O. R.R. (1931), and United States v. United States Shoe Corp. (1998). In Williams v. United States, the argument that an act of Congress prohibiting the interstate transportation of liquor into states where its manufacture or sale was illegal violated the clause was rejected. In Louisiana PSC v. Texas & N.O. R.R., a rate order of the Interstate Commerce Commission that allowed an additional charge for ferrying traffic across the Mississippi River was upheld despite objections that it gave an unconstitutional preference to Texas ports. In United States v. United States Shoe Corp., the Supreme Court held that a "harbour maintenance tax" was indeed a tax and could not be imposed on vessels engaged in exportation.
The Port Preference Clause is particularly relevant to the Jones Act, which prohibits foreign vessels from transporting goods between US ports. Some argue that the Jones Act violates the Port Preference Clause by favouring West Coast ports over those in Alaska and Hawaii, contributing to the high cost of living in these states. The Supreme Court has indicated its interest in limiting the scope of the Commerce Clause, and the Port Preference Clause is one of the few provisions that restrict it. The circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Port Preference Clause, including concerns about large-state oppression of small states, further support the interpretation that the Jones Act violates the clause.
The Port Preference Clause is not limited to Congress but also applies to the states. This interpretation is supported by early cases such as Passenger Cases (Smith v. Turner) in 1849 and Cooley v. Board of Wardens in 1851. The clause's language suggests that it applies to the national government, and the Supreme Court emphasised this point in 1886. However, the clause has been interpreted not to apply to federal statutes with merely incidental effects on states.
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