Income-Based Discrimination: What Standard Of Review Applies?

The standard of constitutional review applied to income-based discrimination is a complex issue that involves examining the specific circumstances and nature of the discrimination. In the United States, courts employ three primary tiers of scrutiny when evaluating equal protection challenges: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review. Strict scrutiny, the most rigorous standard, is applied when a fundamental constitutional right is infringed or when government action involves a suspect classification, such as race, religion, or national origin. Intermediate scrutiny is the second level of review and is often used in equal protection challenges involving gender discrimination or certain First Amendment cases. The least rigorous standard, rational basis review, requires the challenger to prove that the government action is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. While income-based discrimination may not directly fall under the categories of race, religion, or national origin, it could potentially trigger strict scrutiny if it affects a fundamental constitutional right. Intermediate scrutiny may also come into play, depending on the specific circumstances and the nature of the protected classes involved.

Explore related products

Constitutional Law: Cases, Comments, and Questions (American Casebook Series)

$300

The reference standards for constitutionality review: in the opinions of the Tunisian Constitutional Council

$87.42 $95

Is the Rational Basis Test Unconstitutional? (Constitutional Discourse)

$7.99 $7.99

USA CONSTITUTION EXAM PREP

$19.99

Proportionality, Reasonableness and Standards of Review in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Elgar International Investment Law series)

$104.64 $171

Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion in the Administrative State

$108.14 $149

Intermediate scrutiny

To pass intermediate scrutiny, the challenged law must further an important government interest by means that are substantially related to that interest. This is in contrast to strict scrutiny, which requires that the government demonstrates its action furthers a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.

Some examples of the use of intermediate scrutiny include:

• Craig v. Boren (1976), which was the first case in the United States Supreme Court to determine that statutory or administrative sex-based classifications were subject to an intermediate standard of judicial review.
• J.E.B. v. Alabama, which concerned specific strikes against male jurors during jury composition.
• United States v. Virginia (1996), also known as the VMI (Virginia Military Institute) case, which concerned male-only admission.
• Caban v. Mohammed (1979), which concerned the statutory denial of the father-child relationship.
• Romer v. Evans (1996), which struck down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that invalidated legal protections based on sexual orientation.

Rational basis review

In the context of constitutional review, the rational basis review is the standard test applied by courts to assess the constitutionality of government actions, particularly those concerning due process and equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This review evaluates whether a government action or law is "rationally related" to a "legitimate" government interest.

The rational basis review, as the name suggests, focuses on the rationale or reasoning behind government decisions. It does not delve into the actual reasons for enacting a statute or whether it achieves a legitimate government objective. Instead, it considers whether there could be any conceivable or hypothetical justification for the action. This approach gives significant deference to the legislature, with courts upholding challenged laws unless they are grossly illogical or unrelated to any legitimate government interest.

Harvard law professor James Bradley Thayer's 1893 article, "The Origin and Scope of American Constitutional Law", laid the groundwork for this concept. Thayer proposed that statutes should be invalidated only if their unconstitutionality is "so clear that it is not open to rational question." Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., a student of Thayer, later articulated a similar idea in his dissent in Lochner v. New York, emphasizing that government actions should not infringe on fundamental principles as understood by traditions and law.

In practice, the rational basis review is the least rigorous form of judicial review, contrasted with intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. It is applied when laws implicate unenumerated rights that the Supreme Court has not recognized as fundamental. This review standard assumes that laws are constitutional unless proven otherwise, and it is the challenger's burden to demonstrate that the government action is irrational or arbitrary and unrelated to any legitimate government purpose.

Strict scrutiny

When strict scrutiny is applied, there is a presumption of unconstitutionality, and the burden of persuasion shifts to the government. The government must then provide sufficient evidence to show that its actions were constitutional and narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. This means that the government must demonstrate that its actions were the least restrictive means available to achieve that interest.

In the context of income-based discrimination, strict scrutiny would require the government to demonstrate that its actions involving income classification further a compelling government interest and are narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. This could include justifying any legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of individuals based on their income.

For example, in the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson (1942), the court applied strict scrutiny to a sterilization law, requiring the state to demonstrate that its classification was not made invidiously or in violation of the constitutional guarantee of just and equal laws. While this case did not specifically address income-based discrimination, it illustrates how strict scrutiny can be applied to protect individuals from discriminatory government actions that burden their fundamental rights.

Explore related products

The Conscience of the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence and the Right to Liberty

$5.38 $6.99

The Constitution: An Introduction

$18.98 $19.99

The Judicialization of Politics in Pakistan: A Comparative Study of Judicial Restraint and its Development in India, the US and Pakistan (Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series)

$42.55 $55.99

Vindicating Socio-Economic Rights: International Standards and Comparative Experiences (Routledge Research in Human Rights Law)

$43.99 $54.99

The Second Amendment: The Supreme Court’s Standard of Review, the Lower Courts Response and Congress' Regulatory Role

$19.99

Poverty and Discrimination

$71.47 $110

Equal protection

The Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no state may deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states, but courts have determined that equal protection principles implicitly apply to the federal government as well.

The Equal Protection Clause was ratified after the Civil War in 1868, with the intention of preventing states from discriminating against African Americans. However, the text of the Clause is worded very broadly, and its scope has expanded beyond its original purpose. While the Clause was initially interpreted to defend equality in civil rights, it has since been interpreted to address social arrangements, such as in the case of Brown v. Board of Education, which prohibited states from maintaining racially segregated public schools.

Over time, courts have developed three general tiers of scrutiny for reviewing equal protection challenges:

• Strict scrutiny: the government must show that its action serves a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
• Intermediate scrutiny: the government must demonstrate that its action furthers an important government interest by using means substantially related to that interest.
• Rational basis review: the challenger must prove that the government action is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

The selection of the appropriate level of scrutiny has been a subject of debate. Justice Antonin Scalia urged the Court to identify "fundamental" rights or "suspect" classes by analyzing the understanding of the Equal Protection Clause when it was adopted, rather than relying on subjective factors.

The Equal Protection Clause has been applied in various contexts, including education, taxation, voting rights, and public benefits. In terms of taxation, the Clause has been interpreted to prevent "parochial discrimination," such as taxation favoring domestic over foreign corporations. In the context of education, the Clause has been used to challenge racial preferences in admissions decisions, with the Supreme Court holding that race and ethnicity cannot be used as factors in these decisions.

While the Equal Protection Clause has been primarily associated with addressing racial discrimination, it has also been applied to other forms of discrimination. For example, intermediate scrutiny has been used in cases involving gender-based discrimination, such as in Craig v. Boren, which addressed sex-based classifications. The courts have also grappled with the question of whether sexual orientation should be considered a suspect classification under the Clause, with cases like Romer v. Evans striking down amendments that invalidated legal protections based on sexual orientation.

First Amendment cases

In the context of First Amendment cases, intermediate scrutiny is applied to constitutional challenges of equal protection and discrimination. This standard of review is used when a law or policy infringes upon a fundamental constitutional right, particularly those found in the Bill of Rights, or when government action applies to a "suspect classification", such as race or national origin.

In the First Amendment context, intermediate scrutiny is often applied to cases involving content-neutral regulations. For example, in American Library Ass'n v. Reno (1994), the court applied intermediate scrutiny to a statute requiring the producers of sexually explicit materials to maintain certain records. The court found that the government was regulating the broad category of adult videos without regard for the content of any particular video, making it content-neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny.

In Craig v. Boren (1976), the Supreme Court created and applied the intermediate scrutiny test to a statute that discriminated on the basis of gender. The Court ruled that any statute that discriminates on the basis of gender must undergo the intermediate scrutiny test.

However, it is important to note that content-based and viewpoint-based laws in the First Amendment context are typically evaluated under strict scrutiny, the highest form of judicial review. Strict scrutiny is applied when a law is not considered neutral and infringes upon a fundamental constitutional right. For example, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2009) and Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar (2015), the Roberts Court applied strict scrutiny and upheld the challenged laws.

In summary, while intermediate scrutiny is applied in some First Amendment cases, particularly those involving content-neutral regulations, strict scrutiny is generally the standard of review for laws that infringe upon First Amendment rights.

Frequently asked questions