Eleanor Finch
Coercive diplomacy is a strategy employed by states to achieve their desired objectives without resorting to military action. It involves the use of threats, limited force, or other forms of coercion to influence the behaviour of other actors in international relations. The aim is to make an adversary comply with one's demands without necessarily having to engage in direct conflict. Coercive diplomacy is distinct from brute force or blackmail, as it allows the adversary to retain the capability to resist, and focuses on deterring or compelling certain actions rather than obtaining something of value. This strategy is employed by a range of coercers, from single countries to alliances of states or international organisations, and its success depends on factors such as credibility, clear communication, and an understanding of the adversary's cost-benefit analysis.
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What You'll Learn
Coercion vs brute force
Coercion and brute force are two distinct concepts in international relations and conflict studies. Coercion refers to the use of threats, limited military force, economic sanctions, or other punitive measures to compel an adversary to change their behaviour or prevent them from taking a particular action. The key aspect of coercion is that it aims to modify the behaviour of an opponent without necessarily resorting to brute force or the complete defeat of the adversary.
On the other hand, brute force refers to the use of indiscriminate violence or massive military power to defeat or suppress an opponent. While coercion involves bargaining and signalling processes, brute force does not necessarily involve shaping the adversary's behaviour but rather focuses on their destruction or defeat.
In the context of counterinsurgency, coercion theory suggests that the use of indiscriminate violence and the coercion of civilians can suppress an insurgency. This theory argues that by manipulating civilian perceptions and reshaping the relationship between insurgents and the populace, the incumbent government can maintain control and cut off resources to insurgents. However, critics argue that the use of coercive counter-terrorism can backfire and increase terrorist activity by escalating violence and swaying civilian support towards insurgents.
While coercion involves the strategic use of threats and limited force, brute force entails the unrestrained use of violence with little regard for bargaining or modifying the adversary's behaviour. Coercion, as a diplomatic strategy, aims to influence an adversary's decision-making process and incentivise compliance, whereas brute force seeks to overpower and defeat the opponent without necessarily shaping their behaviour.
In practice, the line between coercion and brute force can sometimes blur. For example, during the 1990-91 Gulf War, the use of deterrence and economic sanctions (coercive tactics) failed to persuade Saddam Hussein to exit Kuwait, ultimately leading to the use of brute force in the form of Operation Desert Storm to remove Iraqi forces. This example illustrates how coercion and brute force can be seen as part of a continuum of strategies employed by states to achieve their diplomatic and military objectives.
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Defensive strategy vs offensive strategy
Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic strategy that involves using threats to coerce an adversary to comply with one's demands without resorting to brute force or military action. It is considered a defensive strategy, distinct from blackmail, which is an offensive strategy that involves using threats to coerce an adversary to give up something of value without resistance. Coercive diplomacy aims to stop an action already undertaken by the adversary and can be a viable means to achieve political objectives and foster a state's national interest.
Defensive strategy in coercive diplomacy involves making demands backed by credible threats of punishment for non-compliance. The threats can include political consequences, such as expulsion from international organizations, economic sanctions, or the limited use of force to demonstrate the potential costs of continued defiance. The key to a successful defensive strategy is credibility, which refers to the expectation that an actor will uphold their commitments based on past behaviour. A defensive strategy seeks to avoid the use of force and instead relies on the threat of force to persuade the adversary to back down.
Offensive strategy, on the other hand, involves using threats to coerce an adversary to give up something of value without putting up resistance. This could include targeting leaders, civilians, or using brute force to demonstrate the costs of non-compliance. An example of an offensive strategy is blackmail, which is considered offensive as it seeks to gain something from the adversary rather than simply protecting one's interests.
The distinction between defensive and offensive strategies is important in coercive diplomacy. Defensive strategies focus on stopping or reversing actions already undertaken by the adversary, while offensive strategies may seek to prevent the adversary from obtaining their objectives or gaining advantages. The use of force in a defensive strategy is limited and serves as a component of a political-diplomatic strategy, whereas offensive strategies may involve the use of force as a means to coerce the adversary.
In summary, defensive strategy in coercive diplomacy involves using threats and political-diplomatic tactics to persuade an adversary to comply with one's demands, while offensive strategy involves using threats and potentially force to coerce the adversary to give up something of value. The success of both strategies depends on credibility and the ability to signal that compliance will not lead to punishment.
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Denial vs punishment strategies
Coercive diplomacy is a strategy that combines threats of force, and, if necessary, the limited and selective use of force in discrete and controlled increments, in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements. Coercion is associated with the threat of punishment and can be differentiated into two types of strategies: denial and punishment.
Denial strategies aim to prevent the adversary from obtaining their objectives. They target the military capabilities of the rival, its military production industry, or supply lines. This type of counterforce strategy requires more enforcement costs for the coercer and may be countered by the target's defence strengthening or military escalation.
Punishment strategies, on the other hand, imply that the target still retains options and chances to avoid bearing compliance costs. This strategy involves inflicting pain on the adversary by targeting civilian-industrial assets, with the hope that the suffering of people will pressure the government. Coercive victimization and eliminationist victimization are two types of punishment strategies. The former raises the costs of war for a government by targeting civilians, while the latter removes civilians from a territory.
Both denial and punishment strategies can be part of a coercer's toolkit, and the choice between them depends on the specific context and objectives. The punishment strategy may be more attractive when the coercer wants to signal their resolve and credibility, as defiance will be met with punishment. On the other hand, a denial strategy may be preferred when the coercer wants to avoid directly harming civilians or when the target has effective counter-coercion measures in place.
The credibility of coercive threats is a key component of the success of coercive diplomacy. According to Anne Sartori, states rarely seek to obtain goals through bluffing, as it undermines their reputation in future crises. This is supported by survey experiment data from Barbara Walter and Dustin Tingley, who found that people invest more heavily in reputation-building when they believe a game will be repeated many times.
In conclusion, the choice between denial and punishment strategies in coercive diplomacy depends on various factors, including the coercer's objectives, the target's capabilities, and the potential impact on civilians. The credibility of threats and the maintenance of reputation are also crucial considerations for successful coercive diplomacy.
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Credibility and resolve
Credibility is closely linked to resolve, which refers to the willingness to stand firm and incur costs. Both credibility and resolve are crucial in coercive diplomacy because they enhance the coercer's power and influence over the target. The denial strategy, for instance, is more effective when the coercer demonstrates strong credibility and resolve, as it requires the target to bear both resistance and compliance costs.
To enhance credibility and resolve, costly signalling can be employed. This involves incurring costs when making threats, signalling that they are genuine. However, some scholars argue that this strategy is rarely used in practice, as actors prefer to signal credibility and resolve in other ways, such as incurring audience costs.
Furthermore, successful coercive diplomacy requires clearly communicated threats and a demonstration of capabilities and resolve. This combination enhances the credibility of attempts to coerce others. For example, the United States threatened military invasion in Haiti in 1994, demonstrating its capabilities and resolve without actually having to use force. This pure case of coercion achieved the desired outcome without resorting to brute force.
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Coercer and target
Coercion in international relations refers to the imposition of costs by a state on other states and non-state actors to prevent or compel certain actions. Coercive diplomacy is a strategy that employs threats to make an opponent stop an action already undertaken. It is regarded as a defensive strategy, distinct from blackmail or deterrence, which are offensive strategies. Coercive diplomacy is an alternative to war and brute force, and it can be employed by a single country, a collective group, an alliance of states, or an international organization. The most common case is a single state assuming the role of the coercer.
The target of coercive diplomacy can also be one of the actors mentioned above, although there is significant debate about whether international organizations, NGOs, or terrorist groups can be included. States often choose to channel coercive diplomacy through international organizations, such as the United Nations, as the United States has done in multiple cases.
The success of coercive diplomacy depends on several factors, including the credibility of the coercer and the target's perception of the coercer's credibility. The coercer must make the opponent aware of their intentions, motivations, and credibility. This can be achieved through clear communication, signalling, and bargaining. The threat must be credible and potent enough to persuade the target that it is in their interest to comply with the demand.
Additionally, the punishment strategy implies that the target retains options and chances to avoid bearing compliance costs. This is why the denial strategy, which requires more enforcement costs for the coercer, is often more effective. The target's counter-coercion measures, such as strengthening defense or military escalation, can also impact the success of coercive diplomacy.
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Frequently asked questions
Coercive diplomacy is a strategy that uses the threat of force or limited use of force to make an enemy stop or undo an action, without resorting to full-on war. It is a flexible, psychological instrument that can be used as an alternative to military action.
In 1994, the United States threatened military invasion to coerce the military regime in Haiti to give up, without applying actual force. This is a pure case of coercion, as no force was used to achieve the desired outcome.
One of the main challenges is maintaining credibility and clearly communicating that compliance will not be met with punishment. If a state believes it will be punished regardless of compliance, it is more likely to choose non-compliance.
