First Use Nuclear Missiles: Who Makes The Call?

what constitutes first use nuclear missiles

The use of nuclear weapons has been a controversial topic since their invention. While NATO has relied on the first use of nuclear weapons to deter or counter a major conventional assault, there is also a policy of 'no first use' in place. This means that nuclear weapons are not envisioned for first use, even to preempt imminent nuclear use against the United States or its allies. However, there are some circumstances in which the use of nuclear missile defence interceptors could be construed as first use, such as if they were used against attacking missiles armed with CBW.

Characteristics Values
Use of nuclear missile defence interceptors Could be considered first use
NATO's use of nuclear weapons To deter or counter a major conventional assault

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Nuclear missile defence interceptors

The use of nuclear missile defence interceptors is a complex issue, as it involves the question of whether the interceptors are considered a first-use of nuclear weapons. This is important because it could impact the sanctity of NFU (No First Use) pledges, which are commitments made by countries not to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict.

While there appears to be little interest in developing modern nuclear-armed missile defences, the use of nuclear missile defence interceptors could still be a concern in certain scenarios. For example, if an adversary were to launch a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies, the US might consider launching nuclear weapons before any incoming warheads detonated, but only upon confirmation with a high degree of confidence that such an attack was taking place.

In the past, NATO has relied on the first use of nuclear weapons to deter or counter a major conventional assault. This policy led to the development of a large stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear-armed missiles, air-delivered gravity bombs, and surface-to-air missiles. However, the alliance has also recognised the importance of avoiding a policy of mutual suicide, as many of these weapons would have detonated on alliance territory.

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Nuclear weapons and declaratory policy

The concept of 'no first use' is further complicated by the interpretation of what constitutes the first use. For instance, the use of nuclear missile defence interceptors against attacking missiles armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons could be construed as first use. However, the 'no first use' policy may still allow for the possibility of 'launching-under-attack', where nuclear weapons are released before any incoming warheads detonate but only upon confirmation that an adversary has initiated a nuclear launch.

The United States, for example, has declaratory policies that stipulate nuclear weapons are not envisioned for first use, even in retaliation against an imminent nuclear attack on itself or its allies. Nevertheless, the possibility of 'launching-under-attack' remains a scenario where the first use of nuclear weapons could be justified.

In summary, while the 'no first use' policy aims to deter the use of nuclear weapons, the complexities surrounding the interpretation of first use and the potential for 'launching-under-attack' scenarios highlight the challenges in maintaining a clear and consistent declaratory policy on nuclear weapons.

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NATO's nuclear weapons and the rationale for 'No First Use'

NATO's nuclear weapons policy has long been based on the principle of '"flexible response', which allows the alliance to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict, including in response to an attack with conventional weapons. This policy was adopted in the early 1970s, when NATO's tactical nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe grew to around 7,400 weapons, including nuclear artillery shells, nuclear-armed missiles, air-delivered gravity bombs, special atomic demolition munitions (landmines), surface-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles and anti-submarine depth bombs.

The rationale for this policy was to deter or counter a major conventional assault, particularly from the Soviet Union. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO has sought to de-emphasise the role of nuclear weapons.

Despite this, NATO has maintained its policy of 'flexible response', which some argue is outdated and lacks any military or strategic rationale. It is argued that the alliance's overwhelming conventional advantages make it difficult to conceive of circumstances under which NATO would require nuclear weapons to successfully manage any crisis in Europe. In addition, the threat of using nuclear weapons has become even more anachronistic, as NATO is now seemingly prepared to undertake out-of-area military missions for a range of reasons, including resolving conflicts, promoting democracy, and protecting human rights.

Furthermore, the use of nuclear missile defence interceptors could be construed as first-use, particularly if such interceptors were used against attacking missiles armed with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

NATO members are currently working on proposals to bring their nuclear weapons first-use policy into alignment with the alliance's stated objectives and commitments, including reviewing arms control and disarmament options in light of the reduced salience of nuclear weapons.

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The Soviet Union's nuclear weapons

The Soviet Union conducted 715 tests between 1949 and 1990, resulting in a wide variety of weapons, from nuclear artillery shells to multimegaton missile warheads and bombs. The Soviet Union reached a peak stockpile of about 45,000 nuclear warheads in 1986.

The Soviet Union ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1928, prohibiting the use of biological and chemical weapons in interstate conflicts. However, reservations were later dropped in 2001.

In terms of what constitutes first use of nuclear missiles, the readiness of NATO to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict has been evident from the beginning of the alliance. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, drafted in 1949 before the Soviet Union had tested a nuclear weapon, commits the allies to come to the defence of all members in the event of an attack.

The addition of the embedded clause, "and, if necessary, retaliating against", stipulates that nuclear weapons are not envisioned for first use, perhaps not even to preempt imminent nuclear use against the United States or its allies. However, this may still allow for the possibility of launching under attack, where the United States would release nuclear weapons before any incoming warheads detonated, but upon confirmation that an adversary had initiated a nuclear launch.

Furthermore, the use of nuclear missile defence interceptors could be construed as first use, especially if used against attacking missiles armed with CBW.

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Ballistic missiles armed with biological weapons

The use of nuclear missile defence interceptors could be construed as first use. This would be unambiguously true if such interceptors were used against attacking missiles armed with CBW (chemical and biological weapons). It would also arguably be technically true if nuclear interceptors were fired against incoming nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) has dismantled Iraq's chemical weapons arsenal, but it is suspected that between 6 and 16 ballistic missiles armed with biological warheads are still hidden in the country. The agents used in the warheads are believed to be anthrax and botulinum toxin.

NATO's readiness to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict has been evident from the beginning of the alliance. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, drafted in 1949, commits the allies to come to the defence of all members in the event of an attack. In the early 1970s, NATO's tactical nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe grew to around 7,400 weapons, including nuclear-armed missiles, air-delivered gravity bombs, special atomic demolition munitions (landmines), surface-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles and anti-submarine depth bombs. In 1979, NATO adopted a modernisation plan involving the deployment of 572 tactical nuclear warheads on ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles.

Frequently asked questions

The No First Use policy states that nuclear weapons are not envisioned for first use, perhaps not even to preempt imminent nuclear use against the United States or its allies.

The readiness of NATO to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict has been evident from the beginning of the alliance. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, drafted in early 1949 before the Soviet Union had tested a nuclear weapon, commits the allies to come to the defense of all members in the event of an attack.

Under some circumstances, the use of nuclear missile defense interceptors could be construed as first use. This would be unambiguously true if such interceptors were used against attacking missiles armed with CBW.

The No First Use policy was adopted to avoid a policy of prompt and mutual suicide, as many of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons would have detonated on alliance territory.

Yes, there is a possibility of launching-under-attack, a scenario where the United States would release nuclear weapons before any incoming warheads detonated, but upon confirmation with a high degree of confidence that an adversary had initiated a nuclear launch against American or allied soil.

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