Congressional Powers Denied: 4 Key Limits In The Constitution

The United States Constitution, signed in convention on September 17, 1787, and ratified on June 21, 1788, outlines the powers and limitations of Congress in Article I, Section 9. While Congress holds legislative powers, there are several areas in which their powers are restricted by the Constitution. Here, we will explore four of these limitations: the Writ of Habeas Corpus, Bills of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Laws, Export Taxes, and the Port Preference Clause. Understanding these restrictions on congressional power is crucial for comprehending the checks and balances within the US political system.

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Congress cannot suspend the writ of habeas corpus

The United States Constitution prohibits Congress from exercising certain powers, as outlined in Article I, Section 9. One such power that Congress cannot exercise is the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

Habeas corpus, which translates to "produce the body", is a legal action that grants prisoners the right to appear before a court to challenge their detention or imprisonment. It is a fundamental protection against unlawful imprisonment, ensuring that individuals cannot be detained without valid legal grounds.

The Suspension Clause, as outlined in Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution, specifically prohibits Congress from suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This clause protects the liberty of individuals by ensuring they have access to habeas relief and can challenge the legality of their detention. While Congress does not generally have the power to suspend the writ, there have been rare and controversial instances where it has been suspended during extraordinary circumstances, such as during the Civil War by President Abraham Lincoln, and during World War II by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The suspension of habeas corpus is permitted by the Constitution only in cases of rebellion or invasion when public safety may require it. For example, Lincoln suspended the writ during the Civil War due to concerns about southern sympathizer judges and the slow pace of the justice system at the time. However, his decision was controversial, and he faced opposition, including from Chief Justice Roger Taney, who found the president's action to be invalid.

In recent times, there have been attempts by presidents to suspend habeas corpus, such as by George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks, but these attempts have been overturned by the Supreme Court. The writ of habeas corpus is a crucial safeguard against unlawful imprisonment, and its suspension is considered an extraordinary measure to be used sparingly and only in the most dire of circumstances.

Congress cannot pass bills of attainder

Congress is prohibited from passing bills of attainder, which are laws that target specific people or groups. This is outlined in Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution, which serves to protect the rights of citizens accused of crimes.

A bill of attainder is a law that applies to a specific person, people, or members of a group, and imposes a legal burden or punishment on them. In other words, it is a law that determines guilt and inflicts punishment on an identifiable individual or group without the protections of a judicial trial. The Supreme Court has identified three types of legislation that would fulfill the "punishment" prong of the test: the historical test, the functional test, and the motivational test. The historical test refers to when the burden has "traditionally" been found to be punitive. The functional test refers to when the type and severity of the burdens imposed are the "functional equivalent" of punishment because they cannot reasonably be said to further "non-punitive legislative purposes". Lastly, the motivational test looks to legislative history to determine whether there is a "congressional intent to punish".

The prohibition against bills of attainder reinforces the foundational idea in the American justice system that the government cannot punish someone unless they receive due process, which usually means a trial. This prohibition also ensures the separation of powers, preventing Congress from usurping the power of the judicial branch.

There have been several instances where laws have been challenged as bills of attainder. For example, in 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit struck down the Elizabeth Morgan Act as a bill of attainder. In another instance, the House of Representatives passed a resolution barring the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) from receiving federal funding, which was later deemed an unconstitutional bill of attainder.

Congress cannot pass ex post facto laws

The United States Constitution prohibits Congress from passing ex post facto laws. This means that Congress cannot retroactively criminalise actions that were legal when they were committed. Ex post facto laws are laws that make an action illegal after that action has already been committed.

The prohibition of ex post facto laws ensures that all citizens are aware of the legality of their actions before they commit them. This is a fundamental principle of free republican government. The ban on ex post facto laws also reinforces the idea that the government cannot punish someone retroactively for an action that was lawful at the time. This protects citizens against potential abuses of government power.

The ban on ex post facto laws is one of the few restrictions that the US Constitution made to the power of federal and state governments before the Fourteenth Amendment. The prohibition applies to both the federal government and state governments. The US Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to its ruling in Calder v. Bull when deciding ex post facto cases. In Calder v. Bull, the court held that the prohibition applied only to criminal matters, not civil matters.

Ex post facto laws have been passed in other countries. For example, after the Finnish Civil War of 1918, the Parliament of Finland passed a law setting up tribunals to try suspected rebels. These tribunals issued death sentences in many cases, although very few of those accused could have committed a crime that carried the death penalty under Finnish law at the time. Several hundred people were executed under what was arguably an ex post facto legal arrangement.

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Congress cannot impose export taxes

The Export Clause, or Article 1, Section 9, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution, prohibits Congress from imposing taxes and duties on articles exported from any state. This clause is designed to prevent Congress from interfering with states' efforts to regulate trade with foreign nations and to protect the rights of citizens accused of crimes.

The Export Clause complements the Import-Export Clause, which prohibits states from imposing tariffs and regulations that conflict with congressional efforts to regulate foreign trade. The Import-Export Clause was adopted by the Constitutional Convention to address the commercial strife between states without major ports and those with major ports, which used tariffs on goods destined for other states to generate revenue.

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Export Clause to exempt not only export goods but also services and activities closely related to the export process from federal taxation. However, the Court has also attempted to limit the term 'Articles exported' to permit federal taxation of pre-export goods and services. In United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp. (1998), the Supreme Court held that an ad valorem tax directly imposed on the value of cargo loaded at U.S. ports for export violated the Export Clause.

The Export Clause's restriction on Congress's taxing power does not extend to user fees, which are charges imposed on the user of a government service to offset the costs of that service. In Pace v. Burgess (1876), the Court found that a stamp tax intended to separate and identify tobacco intended for export was not a duty on exportation but rather compensation for services properly rendered.

Congress cannot pass trade regulations that favour one state's ports over another's

The United States Constitution denies Congress certain powers, as outlined in Article I, Section 9. One of these powers is the ability to pass trade regulations that favour one state's ports over another's. This is known as the Port Preference Clause, and it ensures that Congress cannot pass any commercial or trade regulations that give preferential treatment to specific states. This clause was designed to prevent discrimination against certain states or regions and to ensure equal treatment for all states in terms of trade and commerce.

The Port Preference Clause is one of the six original limitations placed on congressional power in Article I, Section 9. While some of the other limitations have been amended or are no longer relevant, the Port Preference Clause remains an important restriction on congressional power. It is a clear statement of the intention of the Constitution's framers to create a fair and equal playing field for all states when it comes to trade and commerce.

The clause specifically prohibits Congress from requiring vessels travelling between ports to stop and pay duties in a third location. This ensures that states cannot use trade regulations to favour their own ports or discriminate against those of other states. By prohibiting Congress from passing such regulations, the Port Preference Clause helps to maintain a level economic landscape across the country.

The inclusion of the Port Preference Clause in the Constitution reflects the framers' recognition of the importance of fair and open trade between states. By denying Congress the power to favour certain states over others in terms of port regulations, the clause promotes a more balanced and equitable economic environment. This clause is a key component of the Constitution's framework for governing interstate commerce and continues to shape the way Congress approaches trade and commerce legislation.

While the Port Preference Clause restricts Congress from passing certain types of trade regulations, it is important to note that it does not prevent Congress from regulating commerce altogether. As outlined in Article I, Section 8, Congress has the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes". This power allows Congress to create uniform laws and regulations that apply to all states, ensuring a consistent approach to trade across the nation.

In conclusion, the Port Preference Clause, as outlined in Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution, is a crucial limitation on congressional power. By prohibiting Congress from passing trade regulations that favour one state's ports over another's, this clause helps to maintain a fair and equal economic landscape for all states. It reflects the framers' intention to create a balanced system of interstate commerce, promoting consistency and fairness in trade regulations across the country.

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